



*Europäischer Metallgewerkschaftsbund  
Fédération Européenne des Métallurgistes  
European Metalworker's Federation*

## **EUCOB@ REPORT**

### **Annual Report: 2001/2002**

**The European Collective Bargaining Information Network**

**of the European Metalworkers' Federation/  
Fédération Européenne de Métallurgistes/  
Europäischer Metallgewerkschaftsbund**

**Collective Bargaining Policy in the European Metal Industry**

**2001/2002**

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## **PART I: Introduction and Overview**

### **1. Preface**

One of the major political goals of the EMF since 1998 is a deepening of the co-ordination of collective bargaining policies of its member organisations. Therefore the EMF affiliates have committed themselves to report regularly on their collective bargaining policy activities. The Select Working Party of the EMF Collective Bargaining Committee started drawing up a concept for a European Collective Bargaining Information Network (EUCOB@), which was adopted by the EMF Collective Bargaining Committee in November 1999. The first Eucob@ report was presented in March 2000 and the second in summer 2001. We now present the third Eucob@ report. As in the second report, we focus on the evaluation of the co-ordination rule (see Part III).

This year we received 15 reports from 13 countries (**Austria, Finland, Greece, Germany, Netherlands, Norway** (Fellesforbundet), **Portugal** (Fequimetal), the **UK, Sweden**, and **Switzerland**. These included two reports from **Sweden** (SIF and Svenska Metall) and two from **Finland** (Metalli and TL, STL, IL, TEK)). And three countries with running agreements (**Belgium, Denmark and Italy**) gave us an update of macro-economic data.

From the central and Eastern European countries we received only reports from two countries (**Czech Republic** and **Slovenia**). We hope to see a change in this poor participation in the future.

Therefore participation is fairly satisfactory but could (and should) have been better. The same goes for the CEEC. These matters are under discussion in the Select Working Party.

### **2. Aims of Eucob@, Participation**

The information was exchanged via e-mail. The eucob@ report is based on two "pillars": Eurostat/Commission data and the reported data in the questionnaire. In early 2002 we introduced a third "pillar" to the eucob@ system: an "ad-hoc-info system". The idea was to get short and quick information from the member organisations about any developments that could be interesting to report, i.e. setting up demands for the next bargaining rounds, industrial action, etc. An example of the need for quick information comes from Germany. In their collective bargaining round in 2002 the employers started negotiations with IG Metall with a list of wage increases in neighbouring countries and claiming that IG Metall's demands were much too high. These figures were only partly correct because the employers forgot to mention wage increases at company level. Probably other EMF affiliates will be confronted with this kind of 'Europeanization' too in the near future. Thus, there are good reasons to strengthen the eucob@ system as a platform for the quick transnational exchange of information.

### 3. Main Issues of European Collective Bargaining: An Overview

The economic situation in Europe has been deteriorating since 2000, and this is still the case in 2002. GDP is going down in all EU countries - with the biggest fall from 2000 to 2001, but this negative trend is continuing in 2002. In countries like **Denmark**, the **Netherlands**, **Austria** and **Sweden**, GDP fell by about 2% from 2000 to 2001, and remains low in 2002 (only in **Denmark** and **Sweden** is the situation improving). (For details see table 12 in Ch. 7.2). The situation in **Ireland** and **Finland** is even worse. There we have a fall in GDP of around 4%. In other countries we have a decrease of 1% each year over the two years. The biggest problem is **Germany**, which ran into a recession at the end of 2001 although this is not the official term used. Labour productivity is poor throughout Europe: we have 11 countries with negative or poor figures around 0,0% for labour productivity in 2001 or 2002, and only three countries where the situation is better (**Greece**, **Ireland** and the **UK**). At the same time unemployment remains high although we have 6 countries with a slight improvement (**Greece**, **France**, **Italy**, **Finland**, **Sweden** and the **UK**). The irony of these poor macro-economic data is that more EMF affiliates were in line with our co-ordination guidelines than we expected one year ago. But the reason for that is not one that we should be happy with.

The "climate" for collective bargaining was therefore getting rougher in Europe. Within 6 months four important strikes were organised by EMF affiliates: two general strikes and two on collective bargaining issues. In November 2001 we had a general strike in **Italy**, in March 2002 a strike in Philips in the **Netherlands**, in April/May a major strike in **Germany**, and in June 2002 a general strike in **Spain**. And **Austria** reported that the "last bargaining rounds were overshadowed by the attempts of the centre-right government to shift nation-wide sector agreements to enterprise level and to amend legal provisions to the workers' detriment, so that the social partners could reach acceptable results for both sides". What is interesting for European trade unions is that the Commission's view is that private consumption holds the key for the recovery gaining momentum.

The **central Eastern European countries** suffered also from the deterioration of the international economic environment. The EU Member States are the most important trade partners of the candidate countries and this had a substantial impact on the development. The Commission expects a sharp deceleration of export market growth for the 10 transition accession countries, cutting by more half the growth rate that was actually expected. The slowdown is particularly marked in **Poland**; on the other hand the **Czech Republic**, **Romania** and **Slovakia** are expected to grow faster in 2001 and 2002 than in 2000 (see European Economy, Economic reform monitor, issue 2001/4). The **Czech Republic** (steel) reported that for the very first time an amendment of the collective agreement has been negotiated in the case of a 3-year agreement. Some company agreements have not been concluded in the foundry sector and this will increase the importance of the sector agreement. **Slovenia** reported that SKEI used trade union fighting tools.

Obviously the economic problems in 2001 and 2002 created difficulties for trade unions. The ECB and the Commission are putting pressure on the trade unions (especially on the bigger economies) to stick to wage moderation. For many EMF affiliates it is difficult to arrive at a positive relation between productivity/inflation and the value of the whole agreement.

In the last report we pointed out that wage policy was at the centre of the last collective bargaining rounds throughout Europe. This time we have a quite similar picture. But besides „pay rises“ qualitative issues remain important – or are even more important. This concerns for instance negotiations about wage structures, like introducing common agreements for blue and white-collar workers. This is an issue at stake in **Austria** and is the basic feature of the current agreement in **Germany**.

EUCOB@ Table 1: Main Issues 2001/2002																		
Issues/country	A	B	DK	FIN	F	D	NL	IRL	I	P	S	E	EL	UK	NOR	CH	CZE	SL0
<b>Wages</b>																		
Wage structure																		
Wage increase	X	X	X	X			X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X
Minimum pay rise	X	X	X															
Apprentice pay																		
<b>Training</b>																		
Vocational training		X					X		X		X							
Training conditions	X			X			X			X						X	X	
<b>Working time</b>																		
Reduction			X	X			X			X	X				X			
Flexibilization			X				X		X							X	X	
<b>Pensions/ Early retirement</b>																		
Pensions		X	X								X				X			
Early retirement	X	X					X											
Suppl. pension schemes		X																
<b>Other agreements</b>	X			X			X		X		X						X	X

We have

- 11 mentions of „pay rise“ and additionally 2 in „minimum pay rise“;
- 11 mentions of „working time“, including 6 on „working time reduction“, one on „working time flexibilization“ and two countries (Denmark and Netherlands) covering both issues;
- 9 mentions of „training“, including 5 on „training conditions“ and 2 on „vocational training“;
- 5 mentions of „pension systems“ and „early retirement“ and finally
- 7 mentions of „other issues“ like continued sickness pay after occupational accidents and regulation of travel allowances (**Austria**), the raising of income-related unemployment benefit (**Finland**), protection of union officials (**Netherlands**), information on fixed term contracts and temporary workers and equal treatment concerning wages, union rights, and working time (**Italy**), better health and safety conditions at the workplace (**Czech Republic**).

Our main interest lies in the way in which the EMF affiliates deal with the co-ordination rule. As in the last report we can establish that **all EMF affiliates** concluded agreements that were higher than the inflation rate in 2001. As the member organisations were successful in not only concluding agreements that were in line with the inflation rate but even above inflation, one basic aim in the current collective bargaining rounds throughout Europe was also reached. The EMF co-ordination rule states that the main reference points should be maintaining purchasing power and achieving a balanced participation in productivity increases. Therefore we have to analyse the inflation rate and labour productivity. We can differentiate between EMF affiliates who succeeded in reaching a “balanced share of productivity” and those countries that did not.

Most of the countries were in line with the productivity/inflation development in 1999, only 5 were not. In 2000 we have a quite different picture, the majority of the countries (13 countries) were not fully in line with the co-ordination rule and only two were. This picture changed again in 2001 when 5 reporting countries were in line with the co-ordination rule and 7 were not. Again in 2002 two countries (**Germany** and **Norway**) are above the co-ordination rule. The other reporting countries (**Italy**, **Finland** (all trade unions), and **Sweden** (all trade unions)) are not fully in line with the co-ordination rule. If we take a closer look we will find that these countries are not very much below the co-ordination rule. They are in a “corridor” of +/- 1%. So these negative differences between the value of the whole agreement and the productivity/inflation figures are not that dramatic and have nothing to do with downward spiralling.

## PART II: European Collective Bargaining in Detail

### 4. Structures of European Collective Bargaining Agreements

In this chapter we give an overview of the next collective bargaining rounds in the “calendar”; the bargaining levels and the coverage represent the major differences in European collective bargaining. An update of previous information is to be found in chapters 5.2. and 5.3.

#### 4.1. Collective Bargaining Calendar 2001-2004

In Europe we have considerable differences concerning the duration of agreements- from 9 months (this year in the **Netherlands**) to up to 5 years as in **Switzerland** and **Slovakia** (engineering). An overview based on the two eucob@ reports is given in table 2. Organisations with agreements running for four or five years (**Denmark**, **Italy**, **Switzerland**) usually have a two level system with annual negotiations at company level. The reported agreements from the **UK** are all company agreements running from one to three years. From a European perspective it is important to know in which country negotiations are starting next (see table 2).

<b>Eucob@ table 2: Duration of collective agreements of EMF affiliates</b>	
Below 1 year	Netherlands (2002)
1 year	Austria, Portugal (Fequimetal), Czech Rep. (Foundry/aircraft prod.)
2 years	Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Finland, Greece, Norway, Slovenia, Czech Rep. (electronics)
3 years	Ireland, Sweden, Czech Rep. (steel), Slovakia (steel/electronics)
4 years	Denmark, Italy
5 years	Switzerland, Slovakia (engineering)

Source: EMF eucob@ reports 2000/2001 and 2001/2002

EUCOB@ Table 3: European Collective Bargaining Calendar (April 2002)							
Country / Organization		Agreements valid from to		Terms (year)	Next negotiations: Start.....end		Current situation
<b>B</b>	<i>CMB, CCMB</i>						
<b>DK</b>	<i>CO-industri</i>	1 Mar 00	1 Mar 04	4	Dec 02 / Mminimum wage to be set in 03	Mar03	Still valid/ annual enterprise-based wage rounds
<b>D</b>	<i>IG Metall</i>						
<b>EL</b>	<i>POEM</i>	Jan 02	Dec 03	2	Jan04		
<b>E</b>	<i>CC.OO, UGT</i>						
<b>F</b>	<i>FGMM CFDT</i>						
<b>IRL</b>	<i>ICTU (SIPTU)</i>						
<b>I</b>	<i>FIOM, FIM, UILM</i>	00	04	4	End of 02 renewal of the national agreement		Still valid
	<i>Local/company level</i>						
<b>NL</b>	<i>FNV</i>	Jul00	Jun02	2	May02		Ongoing negotiation
<b>A</b>	<i>GMT</i>	11/01	Un-limited	Annual re-negotiation	Autumn 01		Still valid
<b>P</b>	<i>Fequimetal</i>	Feb 02	Feb03	Annual			
<b>P</b>	<i>SIMA</i>						
<b>FIN</b>	<i>Metalli</i>	01 Feb01	31Jan03	2	Autumn 02		
<b>FIN</b>	<i>STL, TL, IL, TEK</i>	01 Feb01	31Jan03	2	Autumn n02		
<b>S</b>	<i>Svenska Metall</i>	Feb 01	Mar 04	3	Jan 04	Mar 04	
<b>S</b>	<i>SIF</i>	Feb 01	Mar 04	3	Jan 04	Mar 04	Either party is entitled to terminate the agreement for expiry on Feb 03 for example if higher inflation than expected.
<b>UK</b>	<i>AEEU, TGWU, GMB, MSF, UCATT</i>						
	<i>Local/company level</i>						
<b>CH</b>	<i>SMUV</i>	07.98	06.03	5			
	<i>Local/company level</i>						
<b>NOR</b>	<i>Fellesforbundet</i>	04.02	03.04	2	03.04		Still valid
<b>NOR</b>	<i>NITO</i>						
<b>CZE</b>	<i>OS KOVO- foundry</i>	Jan02	Dec02	1	Autumn 02		
<b>CZE</b>	<i>OS KOVO-electro</i>	Jan01	Dec02	2	Autumn 02		
<b>CZE</b>	<i>OS KOVO-steel</i>	Jan01	Dec03	3	Autumn 03		
<b>CZE</b>	<i>OS KOVO- aerosp</i>	Jan02	Dec02	1	Autumn 02		
<b>SLK</b>	<i>OZ KOVO- engine</i>						
<b>SLK</b>	<i>OZ KOVO- electro.</i>						
<b>SLO</b>	<i>SKEI</i>	Jul00J	Jul02	2	Spring 02		

## 4.2. Bargaining Levels

EUCOB@ Table 4: Bargaining Levels																			
Level	A	B	DK	FIN	F	D	NL	IRL	I	P	S	E	EL	UK	NOR	CH	SLO	CZE	SLK
<b>National</b>	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X		
<b>Company/ local</b>			X					X	X 2131 aggr.		X	X		X	X	X	X		X
<b>Sector</b>	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X				X	X	
<b>Inter-Sector</b>								X				X							
<b>Sub-Sector</b>												X						X	X

“Bargaining levels” are important to understand the structures of collective bargaining in the member countries. These structures have not changed since last year. The vast majority of collective agreements covered by the reports are multi-annual sector agreements, but there are major exceptions (see eucob@ report 1999/2000, p. 7).

In this connection, it might be helpful to see the way in which the Commission considers these aspects. The Commission published an overview about collective bargaining systems in Europe in “European Economy” (spring 2002). (See appendix 1). They distinguish very roughly between “centralised wage setting”, i.e. where the dominant level of wage negotiations is sector/intersectoral, mixed wage setting where both sector/intersectoral and company levels of wage negotiations are important, and decentralised wage setting, i.e. where wage negotiations mainly take place at the company level. According to some economic models they do not like the „mixed wage setting“ system but this is exactly the type that dominates Europe. 10 out of 15 European countries belong to the „mixed wage setting“ system (**Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, Portugal, Sweden**); three countries have a decentralised structure (**France, Netherlands, and the UK**); and two countries a centralised structure (**Ireland, Finland**). As we all know, there are some basic differences between the structures of collective bargaining between let us say Denmark and Germany, or Portugal and Austria, or Greece and Sweden. Nevertheless that is the way the Commission is considering these structures. Our eucob@ system provides us with better and more sophisticated information about collective bargaining structures in Europe.

#### 4.3. Coverage

Country / organisation		Members	Employee indirect)	Blue-/ white collar
<b>B</b>	<i>CMB, CCMB</i>	70.000	166.000	Blue
<b>DK</b>	<i>CO-Industri</i>		300.000 (100.000)	Both
<b>DK</b>	<i>IDA</i>	8.000	80.000	Acad.
<b>D</b>	<i>IG Metall</i>		3.600.000	Both
<b>EL</b>	<i>POEM</i>	50.000	150.000	Both
<b>E</b>	<i>CC.OO, UGT</i>			
<b>F</b>	<i>FGMM CFDT</i>			
<b>IRL</b>	<i>ICTU (SIPTU)</i>			
<b>I</b>	<i>FIOM, FIM, UILM</i>		655.787 Total workforce: 1.600.000	No difference betw. b/w-c. workers
<b>NL</b>	<i>FNV</i>	29.000	285.000	Both
<b>A</b>	<i>GMBE GPA</i>		104.546 blue-collar 52.757 white-collar workers Total workforce: 164.308	Both Joint negotiations but separate agreements
<b>P</b>	<i>Fequimetal</i>	50500		
<b>P</b>	<i>SIMA</i>			
<b>FIN</b>	<i>Metalli</i>	120000	130000	Blue
<b>FIN</b>	<i>STL, TL, IL, TEK</i>	30000		White
<b>S</b>	<i>Svenska Metall</i>	170 051		Blue
<b>S</b>	<i>SIF</i>	80.000	100.000 Workforce: 380.000	White
<b>UK</b>	<i>AEEU, TGWU, GMB, MSF, UCATT</i>			
<b>NOR</b>	<i>Fellesforbundet</i>	40.000	55.000	Blue
<b>NOR</b>	<i>NITO</i>			
<b>CH</b>	<i>FMTH, VSAM, Syna, ASC, SSEC</i>	23.000 (FMTH)	327.000	
<b>CZE</b>	<i>OS KOVO- steel</i>	28.600	42.886	Both
<b>CZE</b>	<i>OS KOVO-electro</i>	7.162	21.536	Both
<b>CZE</b>	<i>OS KOVO-foundry</i>	2.564	4.798	Both
<b>CZE</b>	<i>OS KOVO- aerosp</i>	1.113	7.182	Both
<b>SLO</b>	<i>SKEI</i>	80.000	100.000	both

As pointed out in the last report, “coverage” is a strong indicator of the political relevance of the collective agreements and moreover of the power of trade unions. Here again, we have a very varied picture across European countries.

## 5. Bargaining Topics and Results

This year we have three groups of reporting countries:

1. Countries with ongoing agreements (6: **Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, and the UK**)
2. Countries with newly-concluded (and reported) agreements (5: **Austria, Portugal, {Fequimetal}, Sweden, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia**)
3. Countries with ongoing negotiations (4: **Germany, Ireland, Greece, and Norway**).

We have received preliminary information from two of the latter countries (**Ireland and Norway**). Countries with ongoing agreements are asked for an update of the delivered data. As countries with still running agreements are mentioned in our last report, we have put these agreements in *italics* (as in the other chapters).

### 5.1. Wage Policy

In the first group, **Belgium** achieved in 2001 a wage increase of 1,16 % and additionally 2,82% for the automatic indexation on top of the wage increase. This year the wage increase is 1,0%.

In **Denmark** we have in 2001 a minimum level of pay about 84,40 Dkr, a general increase of 1,0% and an average wage increase at company level of about 3,1%. In Denmark about two-thirds of the entire labour costs are negotiated at company level.

In **Finland** (Metalli) we have a wage increase in 2001 of about 2,4%, and in 2002 about of 3,2%, which is in both cases well above the p+i-figure for Finland. **Finland's** white-collar trade unions (TL, STL, IL, TEK) secured a 2,9 % wage increase in 2001 and 2,2% in 2002.

In **Italy** the wages in national companies or in local companies have been raised through a mechanism of results in productivity and company profitability. The average figure per year is about L.1.500.000 (774 €). N.B. The national agreement was not signed by the biggest trade union (FIOM) but by FIM and UILM.

In **Greece** we have a wage increase in 2002 of 3,0 % (36,14 €) and in 2003 of 4,5% (38,31 €). A premium for work under difficult conditions has been secured, as well as a seniority bonus for workers after completing ten years of service.

In those countries with new collective agreements we have to mention **Austria** where an increase in minimum pay of 3% was reached; the effective wage increase will be 2,9% and no less than 43,60 €. In contrast to previous years, the new metalworking industry agreement does not include a “distribution option” (Verteiloption), whereby companies may flexibly allocate part of the wage increase to particular groups of workers- on the basis of a works agreement between management and works council - in return for awarding a greater total pay increase.

**Portugal** (Fequimetal) secured a wage increase of 4.1% but improvements are possible at the local level.

In **Sweden** Svenska Metall obtained a 2,3% rise in 2001 in the national agreement, and another 2,0 % in 2002, while distribution is left to the local parties. **Sweden's** white-collar trade union SIF secured an increase of 1,8% in 2001 and an individual wage review that is estimated at 0.7% at least. The individual wage review will be negotiated at local/company level by the local trade unions and the individual employer. All members are guaranteed a minimum wage increase of 700 SEK under the terms of the agreement, and minimum wages will be increased by 3 %.

In most countries of the EU-15 group we can see a slight rise in wages, but these increases are very moderate and the majority of the reporting countries were below the EMF co-ordination rule in 2001 (see details in chap. 7). This picture will not change in 2002.

It is important to keep in mind that further improvements at company level are possible in most countries (such as **Italy**) or as part of the general agreement (as in **Denmark**). In **Switzerland** there are wage negotiations at enterprise level only.

The majority of the collective bargaining structures consist of a two-level system: bargaining takes place at a national/sector level *and* at company level. The wage increase figures mentioned usually refer to the agreements concluded at national or sector level. Sometimes the proportion to be distributed at company level is already included (**Austria**) sometimes not (**Norway**). Most agreements include an increase in the minimum standard wage, which may then be boosted further at company level. In countries like **Austria, Belgium, Finland** and **Germany** further improvements at company level are possible. Between 20-25% of the entire labour costs are negotiated at company level in the **Netherlands** and this is as much as two-thirds in **Denmark**.

### Central and Eastern European Countries:

The **Czech Republic** reported on four agreements:

- Aircraft production: increase of minimum wage rates by 5 % and of average wage by 4%
- Steel: minimum wage rate increased by 10 %
- Foundry: average wage increase secured from individual employers, increase of minimum wage rates by 14%
- Electronics: increase of minimum rates by 14 %. In addition: a 3% increase of average wages by individual employers.

**Slovenia** reports a wage increase of 9,1% in 2001 and of 2,7% in 2002 plus 14,50 EUR – this means about 3%. An additional increase is expected after bargaining under the new wages system (see chap. 8 for Central and Eastern European Countries).

EUCOB@ Table 6: Wage Policy in the European Metal Industry 2001/2002						
	M	J	Nat/reg	Local	Others	Details
A	Not fixed	11/01-	X/X	Improvements possible		Increase in minimum pay: 3%, (=1.187.92 €) Increase in real wages 2,9% but at least 43,60 €. In contrast to previous years the new metalworking industry agreement does not include a "distribution option" (Verteiloption), whereby companies may flexibly allocate part of the wage increase to particular groups of workers (on the basis of a works agreement between management and the works council), in return for awarding a greater total pay increase
B	24	01-02	1,5% (5 BEF on average wage of 330BEF/h)	Improvements possible	01: extra-legal pension: 1,25% 02: 1,5%	01: 1,5 % wage increase/ 2,82 % (automatic indexation on top of wage increase) 02: 0,9% wage increase + 1,97 % automatic indexation
DK	48	00-03	Ca. 1/3 of labour costs	Ca. 2/3 of labour costs: entire wage increase 01: 3,1%	1% all but wages	Minimum level of pay: 3/01: 84,40 Dkr 3/02: 86,40 Dkr Apprentice pay: 3-4% Benefits 2000: 5%; 02: 2%
F						
FIN-Metalli	24	01-03	Nat./at least 2,1%	Improvements possible		01: 2,4%

EUCOB@ Table 6: Wage Policy in the European Metal Industry 2001/2002						
	M	J	Nat/reg	Local	Others	Details
FIN-TL, STL, IL, TEK	24	01-03	2,2-2,7% minimum	Improvement possible - partly distributed at plant level		TL + STL: 2,9% in 01 TL + STL: 2,2% in 02; Rest placed to tables up to 4%
D	24	02-03	Nat./reg.		Impact of new scheme for b+w-collar workers: 02; 0,5; 03: 0,5	2,1% wage increase: May 01-Feb02; From June 02: 4,0%; a one-off payment of 120 € for May 02 03: 3.1 % from June 2003.
NL	24	Jul00	Jul02	Wages 20-25% higher than nat. minimum standards	Further differentiation on company level	3,45 % per 1/10/2001
IRL	33			Gain-sharing can be negotiated		
I	24	01-02	3,5% For 2 years	Ongoing negotiations on comp. level		FIOM did not sign the agreement
NOR	24	02-04	Nat./ Loc.			Wage increase: 00: 4,5; 01: 4,7; 02: 4,8% (nat.+local level together)
P-SIMA	24-36			Yearly review of agreements		
P-Fequi-metal	12	02	4,1	4.1% directly/ Improvements possible		Wages: 00: 3,5; 01: 3,7; 02: 4,1
UK						
EL	24	02-03	Nat.			Wage increase: 02: 3,0 (33,14 €) 03: 4,5 (38,31 €)
E						
S-Metall	36	01-04	Nat/loc.	Distribution by local parties		2001: 2,3 % in national agreement, 2002: 2,0 % in national agreement
S SIF + CF	36	01-04		Improvement possible		01/02/02 1,8 % + individual wage review est. at least 0.7% (note: the individual wage review will be negotiated at local/company level by the local trade unions and the individual employer)  All members are guaranteed a minimum wage increase of 700 SEK under the terms of the agreement (01/02/01 – 31/03/04). Minimum wages will be increased by 3 %.
CH	60	98-03	Nat./ Loc.	Wages at company level only		
CZE-Aerosp	12	02	Sector			Minimum wage rates increased by 5 % and average wage by 4 %.
CZE-Steel	36	01-03	Sector			Minimum wage rates increase by 10 %.
CZE-Foundry	12	02	Sub-sector	Company		Average wage increase at individual employers, increase of minimum wage rates by 14%
CZE-Electro	24	01-02	Sector	Company		Increase of minimum rates by 14 %. Increase of average wage by 3 % at individual employers.
SLO	24	00-02	Nat./ Sector	Company	We expect an additional increase after bargaining under the new wages system	01: 9,1 02: 2,7 % + 14,50 EUR (3%)

## 5.2. Working Time

In the last eucob@ report we received 9 reports from 7 countries (**Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, Italy, Austria, Sweden** and the **UK/Ford Motor** company). Since these agreements are still valid, we have put them in again in *italics*. This time we received 5 reports from 4 countries. Basic agreement are still running like the national agreement on the reduction of working time in **Italy** concluded in 1999. We have a similar situation in **Austria** where the collective agreement on working time flexibility was prolonged in 1999 for an unlimited period. In **Finland** annual working hours were shortened by one day (8 hours) in 2002. From **Sweden**, Svenska Metall reported a reduction of working hours by 0,2/h per week in 2001 and by 0,1/h a week in 2002. Sweden's white-collar workers' trade union SIF reported a reduction of annual working time by one day. This step is part of the previous agreement in 1998 under which working time will be reduced by six days up to 2004.

EUCOB@ Table 7: Working time in the European metal industry 2001/2002		
C	Reduction	Flexibilization
DK	98: reduction for 2nd and 3rd shifts from 35 to 34 hours; 00: extra 5 days of leave for all (Total now 6 weeks)	98: 1 h extension in daily hours without bonus Extension of reconciliation period from 6 to 12 months; 00: working time can be fixed weekly, monthly or annually; In cases of experiments: alternative wo'ti arrangements can be agreed
I	The agreements applied the new reduction time as per the national agreement (1999) for shiftworkers and negotiated the "Bank of time" (for overtime).	Agreement 99 Companies >200: 200 overtime hours paid at half rate Companies < 200: 250 hours paid 25% (day) and 50% (night). The first 32 resp. 40 h are not subject to negotiation. Weekly flexibility: 32-48h; 64 h per annum only for seasonal production
NL	2000: 1736 hours per year 2001: 1728 hours per year 2002: 1728 hours per year	Right for all employees to work part-time
A	In 2000: The collective agreement on working time flexibility, signed in October 1997, was due to expire in 1999 and has been prolonged in 1999 for an unlimited period. Weekly working time may thus vary from 32 to 45 hours, with use of a "time account" required from the 41 <sup>st</sup> hour.	
P	The collective agreement signed by SIMA was the first introducing the 40/week.	The collective agreement includes flexibilisation of working time
FIN/ metalli	2002: one day (8 hours); No limitations in overtime	No limitations in overtime
NOR	5 more days of vacation	Est. 0,9 in 00; 0,4 in 01
S	Svenska Metall: 2001, 0,2/h a week shortening working hours. 2002, 0,1/h a week SIF Working time reduced by one day = est. To 0,5 %. (Combined with the previous agreement in 1998, working time will be reduced by six days up to 2004)	
CH		Flexibility increased

### 5.3. Pensions and Early Retirement

In the last report we mentioned 8 reports (**Belgium, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, the UK**) and the implementation of the 35-hour working time law in **France**. All these agreements are still valid and have to be taken into account and therefore we have put them into the table given below in *italics*. New agreements are coming from **Austria** where new rules for part-time working for older workers were implemented in 2000 covering issues such as severance payments and bonuses; this year it is reported that in a joint resolution the signatory parties call upon the government to maintain existing legal regulations in the field of early retirement. **Sweden** reports about new options for workers, who can decide whether to use the reduction in working time for earlier retirement instead of reducing working hours.

<b>EUCOB@ Table 8: Pensions and Early Retirement in the European Metal Industry 2001/2002</b>				
<b>C</b>	<b>Pension scale adjustment</b>	<b>Additional pension scheme</b>	<b>Financing early retirement</b>	<b>Financing reduction for older employees</b>
<b>B</b>	<i>Extra-legal pension scheme: (1%): 0.5% improvement</i>	<i>Pre-pension: Nat. level: from age 58 Reg. Level: from age 57 Comp. Level: from age 56</i>		
<b>DK</b>	<i>In 4 annual rates the contribution increased up to 9% for b-collar workers and 8,1% for w-collar workers. 2/3 paid by the employer and 1/3 paid by the employee</i>			
<b>D</b>			<i>As of 57 years of age, employees are entitled to a part-time-early-retirement procedure, during max. 6 years, From 57-60 years of age, employees (full-time workers) receive 82% of their net pay (3 years); from 60-63 of age, these stop work, receiving 82% of their net pay for a further three years; from the age of 63 to the date of regular retirement, the persons concerned receive a one-off settlement (calculated at DM 450 every month between early and regular retirement) as compensation for the reduction in relation to regular pensions. Companies affected are protected against „overstressing“: in the first two years of the agreed term, 4% of staff of a company can participate, in the third year 5% of staff</i>	
<b>E</b>			<i>Early retirement under specific conditions</i>	
<b>NL</b>			<i>Employees over 55 do not have to work overtime or work in shifts</i>	
<b>A</b>	<i>In 2000: New rules for part-time for older workers implemented, covering: issues such as severance payments and bonuses; this year, in a joint resolution, the signatory parties call upon the government to maintain existing legal regulations in the field of early retirement</i>			
<b>S</b>	<i>One of the new options for the workers was that if they wanted to use the shortening of working hours for earlier retirement instead of shortening working hours</i>			
<b>UK</b>	<i>Pre-retirement scheme: during the last 13 weeks of employment leading up to the 65<sup>th</sup> birthday. Employees will be allowed 1 paid day of work per week (restricted)</i>			
<b>NOR</b>	<i>The employers have to discuss the pension situation with the local shop stewards, aiming to establish a collective company pension in addition to the national insurance scheme</i>			
<b>CH</b>	<i>Company specific agreements only</i>			

## 5.4. Vocational Training

In the eucob@ report 1999/2000 we received reports from **Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Czech Republic** and last year we received in addition reports **Austria, Finland, Germany, and Italy**. These agreements are mostly still running, but sometimes new agreements have been made based on those concluded two years before. This is the case in **Sweden**: one of the results of the previous agreement was that every employee shall have the right to an individual plan for development skills and competence if he/she asks for it, provided by the company. Some other changes were also made in the requirements for the distribution of wages, meaning that workers with a low increase of salary shall receive special attention in the area of training. In **Austria** a joint declaration of will was signed to promote further training activities at enterprise level; in addition, the signatory parties agreed to set up a working group to prepare a social partners meeting on vocational training and further training in June 2002

The other agreements focus on the improvement of existing vocational training systems (**Sweden, Netherlands**), pay increases (**Germany, the Netherlands**), or better opportunities (**Finland, Norway**). In some member countries vocational training is yet not covered by collective bargaining but by law, as is the case in **Portugal, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia**.

EUCOB@ Table 9: Vocational training in the European metal industry 2001/2002		
C	Education fund	Improving training conditions
B		1. Specific measures for paid leave (up to 3 years), among the reasons: personal training
DK	- The contributions for different organisations have increased - The white and blue collar funds have merged	
D		Pay Increase for vocational trainees of 3%
F		Access to voc. training plans and activities (Metal bipartite qualification and certificate) for temporary workers + young people; New classification structure concerning wages, working time and voc. training
I	All the agreements contain a commitment by the employers for vocational training during working time according to new qualifications of workers and the organisation of work.	
NL		Companies pay 0,81% of the total wage-bill to a fund for education and labour market policy
A	Joint declaration of will to promote further training activities on enterprise level; in addition, the signatory parties agreed to set up a working group to prepare a social partners' meeting on vocational training and further training in June 2002	
P		
FIN		Certain measures of the state to increase allowances for further vocational training as well as the resources for universities.
S	To the existing agreement on training and development is added: "Individual development planning can be an important basis for the joint development of skills and competence of the personnel and the company. An individual development plan shall be set up for each individual employee who requests this" The individual worker has more rights and influence in the area of training, especially if the worker has a low or bad wage increase. One of the results of the agreement was that each employee should have the right to an individual plan for development skills and competence if he/she asks for it, provided by the company. Some other changes were also made to the requirements for distribution of wages meaning that workers with a low increase of salary shall receive special attention in the area of training.	
NOR		The employees' right to documentation of skills has been strengthened
CH	Variable	
CZE	Foundry/steel: Conditions being negotiated on increase of workers' qualifications and their own re-skilling.	

## 5.5. Other Agreements

We decided to include a final category for “other agreements” because diversity in European collective bargaining is not just a catch phrase but reality. Incoming reports range from continued sickness pay (**Austria**), and improved health and safety at the workplace (**Sweden, Czech Republic**) to information rights and equal treatment (**Italy**). Thus it seems that we were right to introduce this category for which we received 6 reports (Table 10).

EUCOB@ Table 10: Other Agreements	
C	Contents
I	Information on fixed-term contracts and temporary workers. Equal treatment (wages, union rights, working time etc.)
A	By amending the legal provision for continued sickness pay after occupational accidents, the government prolonged the period of entitlement for sickness pay, but nevertheless reduced the entitlement for collectively agreed additional sickness payments by 6 weeks. In order to compensate the loss of income, an additional payment for sickness after occupational accidents was agreed; collectively agreed regulations for travel allowances by car, improving the legal regulation, and increase in daily allowances for travel abroad-
FIN	Metalli: Raising of income-related unemployment benefit (relation betw. daily unemployment benefit and previous income). Joint development working party (employers and trade union) to collect and exchange experiences re improvement of company competitiveness and the well-being of the personnel, and further training and development projects
S	Svenska Metall: Health and safety. Some progress was made in the agreement on health and safety at the workplace, i.e. local co-operation, work environment training and the occupational health service. SIF - see last eucob@ report: Working environment/health and safety: the existing agreement has been strengthened as regards additional training on environmental issues for trade union reps. and managers. The social partners at national level shall jointly analyse the impact on working environment of work organisation, working time and the use of new technology
NL	Further decentralisation of coll.barg., differentiation on comp. level; time-saving possibilities on comp. level, protection of union officials, religious holidays and study of the modernisation of job ranking system
CZE	Foundry/Aircraft prod.: Health and safety conditions at the workplace, social requirements of workers, ensuring trade union activities in companies.
SLO	Defence of current working and trade union rights in <b>norm part</b>

## 6. Importance, Political Aspects of Collective Bargaining and Next Steps

In chapter 5 we presented the results of the last bargaining rounds in the European metal industry. In this chapter we wanted to have the EMF affiliates' view of the specific features of the concluded agreements. For that we added a special question (6.1.). We also wanted information on the “climate” in which the negotiations took place, i.e. was it “normal procedure” or were they accompanied by industrial action (6.2.)?

### 6.1. Importance of the last Bargaining Round

We have just presented the figures especially concerning wage policy, but what we do not yet know is the significance of these results. We have received 6 answers on this. **Austria** reported that the “last bargaining rounds were overshadowed by the attempts of the centre-right government to shift nation-wide sector agreements to enterprise level and to amend legal provisions to the workers' detriment; however, the social partners were able to reach acceptable results for both sides”. For **Sweden's** white-collar organisation SIF what was most important was the guaranteed wage increase for everybody, flexibility of working time and the level of wage increases. In **Norway** Fellesforbundet reported that the significance of the fact that the employers are obliged to discuss the pension situation for the employees with the local shop stewards aiming to establish a collective company pension in addition to the national insurance pension. In the **Netherlands**, besides wage increases, attention was drawn to the different aspects of vocational training like the promotion of the participation in

training and courses, improving the quality of such courses, and the fair sharing of training costs.

The **Czech Republic** (steel) reported that an amendment of the collective agreement has been negotiated for the very first time in the case of a 3-year agreement. Some company agreements in the foundry sector have not been concluded and that will increase the importance of the sector agreement. **Slovenia** reported that SKEI used trade union fighting tools.

## 6.2. Political Aspects of Collective Bargaining Policy

As we said earlier, the climate for collective bargaining was getting rougher in Europe. In **Italy** a general strike was organised in protest against dramatic changes affecting all labour market policies. At the end of September 2001, a general National Assembly of 5000 FIOM delegates, held in Verona, decided upon a national general strike in metalworkers' plants with a national demonstration in Rome on 16th November. This was the second strike after a successful national 8-hour strike on 6th July accompanied by local demonstrations. The demonstration in support of national collective bargaining and democracy at the workplace, i.e. the right to decide about collective agreements for all the workers, also took a stand against the so-called "White Paper" issued by the government. This calls for doing away with national collective bargaining, for wage differentiation in different regions, total flexibility in labour market and wages; abandoning the tripartite decisional process between the social partners and the government. Finally, it also calls for a new law on immigration stipulating that permission to stay in the country for migrant people ends when their job is terminated, after which they will be obliged to leave the country. Our colleagues from FIOM reported also that the national demonstration in Rome meant that the metalworkers and FIOM refuse this "diktat" from the employers, want to reboot the table for national negotiations and take a stand for democracy and against any kind of imposition.

In **Spain** a general strike was organised too on June 20<sup>th</sup> 2002. This general strike is considered as "a mobilisation by society as a whole" against the suppression of workers' rights and cutting back on unemployment benefits, against imposing a new production model based on unstable employment and low labour costs, the arbitrary power of the employer, and the deterioration of working conditions. With this policy the Spanish Government is undermining the balance of economic growth and social cohesion heralded at the Lisbon Summit and ratified in Barcelona. Therefore the Spanish EMF affiliates carried out this strike to move the Spanish society forward towards convergence with Europe in justice and social cohesion and better working and living conditions.

The first major strike after introducing the Euro was organised in **Germany**. After a 10-day strike, IG Metall concluded an agreement of around 4% for 2002 and 3,1% in 2003. With the help of the Eucob@ system, all EMF affiliates were informed as to which companies were going on strike. Because of the new German labour law, IG Metall replaced its traditional long strikes at selected employers with shorter, sudden stoppages for one day only. All Eucob@ correspondents were informed daily as to which companies were going on strike so that strike-breaking work could be prevented. The EMF launched an action plan in support of IG Metall strike actions. EMF and IG Metall organised a common press conference on May 10<sup>th</sup> and adopted the „Frankfurt declaration“. We think that these actions taken by EMF proved the efficiency of the Eucob@ information system. EMF will make an analysis about the strike in Germany in relation to the dynamics of the europeanization of industrial relations.

At the end of March 2002, the **Netherlands'** FNV Bondgenoten and CNV Bedrijvenbond organised a strike at **Philips** for a new collective agreement. The reason for this massive strike was Philips' rejection of a 3,5% pay increase for a 15-month collective agreement,

which is equal to the maintenance of consumer purchasing power in the Netherlands. Philips offer was 2,5%. In the Netherlands Philips traditionally negotiates a national collective agreement, separate from the general "metal-electro" national collective agreement.

<b>EUCOB@ Table 11: Political and economic background 2001/2002</b>		
<b>C</b>	<b>Tools</b>	<b>Political implications</b>
<b>DK</b>	National Sect oral	*Bipartite negotiations and mediation *2000: ballot with 80% approval rate * Agreement is a reference for the entire private sector
<b>D</b>	Bipartite	10-day strike in April 02
<b>E</b>	Bipartite	General strike on June 20th 02
<b>I</b>	9 months of bargaining bipartite negotiations -Mediation by the Ministry of Labour -40-hour strike	-Basic national inter-sector tripartite framework agreement fixing the unions' demands -Initially employers fiercely opposed a national collective bargaining agreement and demanded total flexibility of working time and contracts; -Most contentious point: the right to national coll.barg. General strike in November 01
<b>NL</b>	Bipartite	Strike at Phillips
<b>A</b>	Bipartite	Overall, the negotiations were extremely difficult due to the ambivalent economic context and the continued conflict between centre-right government and trade unions
<b>S</b>	Bipartite	In Sweden we have an agreement between the parties in the Industry Sector, which means that the parties at the sector level have to start the bargaining round 3 months before the agreement expires. The sector parties have then 2 months to reach a new agreement. If they fail, there will be mediation in the last month by two contracted mediators. SIF: Arbitration in line with the so-called Industrial Agreement, which is signed by the trade unions and the employers' associations in manufacturing industry.
<b>SLO</b>	4 trade unions on employees side, 3 associations and 3 sections on employers side	We undertook a 2-hour warning strike and announced a 1-day general strike in the branch

## PART III: Evaluation of the European Co-ordination Rule

### 7. Evaluation of the Co-ordination Rule

The EMF co-ordination rule was proposed by the 3rd Collective Bargaining Conference in 1998 and later confirmed by the EMF Executive Committee and the EMF Congress in 1999. It is an important part of the overall EMF political project: To strengthen the co-ordination of collective bargaining policies and provide an answer to the possible downward spiral of cost-competitive wage bargaining.

We discussed the methodological problems of comparing national data on a European level *en detail* in the last eucob@ report. We do not need to repeat this here, but we would simply like to recall that the EMF co-ordination rule states “that the main reference point for the EMF affiliates must be to maintain purchasing power and achieve a balanced participation in productivity increases”. How this is implemented comes under the sovereignty of the individual unions, but mention is made, among other elements, of income redistribution, improved wages and salaries, job-creation, including training and reduced working time, new forms of work organisation, fostering equal opportunities and early retirement. The co-ordination rule should be interpreted to include the “whole collective bargaining package” – and not only the wage elements.

We decided that

- the bargaining figure to enter into the comparison is at all times the nationally reported figure for the whole collective bargaining package; in the report we call it “the value of the whole agreement” (**Vowa**);
- to ensure a European comparability of the figures, the national bargaining results have to be compared with the Eurostat figures for consumer price inflation and productivity development for the entire economy.

In this report for the **EU member states** we use the data from the report on economic trends (in “European Economy”, supplement A) released in spring 2002. This data can be downloaded from the following website: [www.http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy\\_finance](http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance).

For the **non-EU European countries, like Norway and Switzerland**, we have had to rely on OECD data. We used the last issue of the “OECD economic outlook” from December 2002. It should be pointed out that this is not a satisfying solution because Eurostat and OECD data are inconsistent.

For the **EU candidate countries**, we use also EU Commission data published in “European Economy”, supplement C, released in may 2002 (“Results of Commission’s spring 2000 economic forecast for the candidate countries”), which can also be downloaded from the above website.

We have chosen to present four tables from the eucob@ report:

- Table 12 on the basic economic data, such as GDP, labour productivity, inflation (HICP), unit labour costs, and unemployment figures. These figures are important in order to understand the whole economic situation in which the current bargaining rounds take place.
- Table 13 on European collective bargaining included the figures on wage increases and the value of the whole agreement (vowa).

## 7.1. Empirical Results 2001/2002

**Eucob@ Table 12: Macro-economic parameters in Europe 2000/2001/2002  
(Eurostat/EU Commission data) <sup>1) 2</sup>**

		Inflation HICP	Labour Prod.	GDP	Unit labour costs	Unemploy- ment
<b>B</b>	00	2,7	2,1	3,7	0,4	6,9
	01	2,4	-0,4	0,8	4,0	6,6
	02	1,6	0,8	0,7	2,8	6,8
<b>DK</b>	00	2,7	2,2	3,0	1,6	4,4
	01	2,3	0,8	1,0	3,7	4,3
	02	2,4	1,6	1,7	2,3	4,2
<b>D</b>	00	2,1	1,1	2,9	1,0	7,8
	01	2,4	0,1	0,6	1,5	7,7
	02	1,4	0,9	0,4	1,1	8,1
<b>EL</b>	00	2,9	4,4	4,2	1,7	11,1
	01	3,7	4,4	4,1	0,9	10,5
	02	3,8	3,1	3,5	3,2	9,9
<b>E</b>	00	3,5	0,8	4,2	2,9	11,3
	01	2,8	0,3	2,7	3,8	10,6
	02	3,6	0,5	1,9	3,6	11,4
<b>F</b>	00	1,8	1,4	3,8	0,7	9,3
	01	1,8	-0,2	1,8	2,9	8,5
	02	1,9	0,3	1,0	2,4	8,8
<b>IRL</b>	00	5,3	5,0	10,0	3,6	4,2
	01	4,0	2,6	5,7	6,4	3,8
	02	4,8	2,0	3,3	5,8	4,4
<b>I</b>	00	2,6	1,0	2,9	2,0	10,4
	01	2,3	0,1	1,8	2,6	9,4
	02	2,6	-0,6	0,4	3,5	8,9
<b>L</b>	00	3,8	3,1	8,9	1,5	2,3
	01	2,4	-4,3	1,0	9,1	2,0
	02	1,9	-2,6	0,1	6,3	2,3
<b>NL</b>	00	2,3	1,1	3,3	3,5	2,8
	01	5,1	-0,6	1,3	5,7	2,4
	02	3,9	-0,1	0,2	5,2	3,1
<b>A</b>	00	2,0	2,8	3,5	-0,6	3,7
	01	2,3	0,0	0,7	1,7	3,6
	02	1,9	0,6	0,7	1,6	4,3
<b>P</b>	00	2,8	1,8	3,5	4,4	4,1
	01	4,4	0,0	3,5	5,0	4,1
	02	3,5	0,0	0,7	4,8	4,6
<b>FIN</b>	00	3,0	3,9	6,1	-0,2	9,8
	01	2,7	-0,4	0,7	5,0	9,1
	02	1,9	1,2	1,4	2,1	9,1
<b>S</b>	00	1,3	1,5	3,6	5,8	5,8
	01	2,7	-0,6	1,2	4,4	4,9
	02	2,1	1,5	1,6	2,5	4,9
<b>UK</b>	00	0,8	1,9	3,1	3,0	5,4
	01	1,2	1,4	2,0	3,9	5,0
	02	1,2	0,9	1,6	2,6	5,0
<b>CH*</b>	00	1,6		3,0		
	01			1,7		
	02			1,1		
<b>NOR*</b>	00	3,1		2,3		
	01	2,7		1,7		
	02	2,25***	1,75***	2,1		

Source: European Economy, No 2/ 2002

\* Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, December 2001

\*\*\* Source: estimates by Norse Bank

1 The abbreviations of the countries follow the common practices in the EU that means that the first letter is used of the native language: Austria (A), Belgium (B), Greece (EL), Denmark (DK), Finland (FIN), France (F), Germany (D), the Netherlands (NL), Ireland (IRL), Italy (I), Luxembourg (L), Portugal (P), Spain (E), Sweden (S), United Kingdom (UK), Norway (NOR), Switzerland (CH); and the candidate countries: Bulgaria (BUL), Czech Republic (CZE), Estonia (EST), Hungary (HUN), Latvia (LAT), Lithuania (LIT), Poland (POL), Romania (ROM), Slovakia (SLK), Slovenia (SLO).

2 GDP: Gross domestic product, volume, change on preceding year, 1961-2002; Labour productivity: Real GDP per occupied person; Unit labour costs: Unit labour costs, whole economy, 1961-2002; Unemployment: Number of unemployed as percentage of civilian labour force, 1964-2002

Eucob@ Table 13: Reported National macro-economic parameters																	
	Year	B	DK	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	A	P	FIN	S	UK	CH	NOR
Inflation	00	<i>1,5</i>	2,8		<i>2,7</i>				<i>1,2</i>	<i>210</i>	2,3	2,2	<i>3,3</i>	1,3	3,0	1,6	3,1
	01	<i>2,5</i>	2,4		<i>3,4</i>				<i>1,7</i>	<i>3,3</i>	2,6	2,8	<i>2,5</i>	1,7	2,8	1,0	3,0
	02	-	1,8	2,0	<i>3,5</i>				-	<i>2,5</i>	1,9	2,5	-	2,0	-	-	1,5
Prod.	00		2,1		<i>4,6</i>					1,8	2,5		<i>3,5</i>	2,7	2,1		2,1
	01		0,8		<i>3,3</i>					-0,75	1,6		<i>3,5</i>	2,5	-		2,8
	02		1,8	2,0	<i>3,0</i>					1,0	1,1		-	-	-		-
Unemployment	00				<i>11,1</i>					3,6	3,7			4,7		2,7	3,4
	01				<i>10,5</i>					3,25	3,6			4,0		2,0	3,6
	02				<i>10,5</i>					3,75	3,6			4,3		2,7	3,9

Table 12 contains the basic macro-economic figures according to Commission data; table 13 the reported data by the eucob@ correspondents. Figures in *italics* are from last year's Eucob@ report and give you a notion about the difference between national and European figures.

Eucob@ Table 14 Vowa 2001/2002						
C		Wage increase	Other elements	Explanations	Value of the whole agreement	
B	01 02	1,5 % (5 BEF on average wage of 330 BEF/hour)	2,82 % (automatic indexation on top of wage increase)	Extra legal pension system: 1,25 %	<b>01: 4,57 %</b> <b>02: 3,87%</b>	
DK	01 02	1,0 Not available	3,1 local	1% impact due to more holidays	<b>01: 4,1</b>	
D	01 02 03	2,1 3,5 3,5	330 DM 2x flat rate (3%) Impact of new common pay structure for b+w-workers: 02:0,5; 03: 0,5	2,1% wage increase: may 01-feb02; from June 02: 4,0%; a one-off payment of 120 € for May 02 03: 3.1 % from June 2003.	<b>01: 2,4</b> <b>02: 4,0</b> <b>03: 4,0</b>	
EL	02 03	3,0 4,5			<b>02: 3,0</b> <b>03: 4,5</b>	
I	01 02	1,75 1,75			<b>01: 1,75</b> <b>02: 1,75</b>	
A	01 02	2,9	Additional sickness payments;/Regulations for travel allowances by car		<b>01: 2,9</b>	
P	01 02	3,7 4,1			<b>01: 3,7</b> <b>02: 4,1</b>	
FIN/ Metalli	01 02	2,4 3,2	Working time reduction 8 hrs in 02	= 0,4%	<b>01: 2,4</b> <b>02: 3,2</b>	
FIN/ TL/STL /IL/TEK	01 02	2,9 2,2	Working time reduction 8 hrs in 02	= 0,4%;	<b>01: 2,9</b> <b>0,2: 2,6</b>	
S/ Svensk a Metall	01 02	2,3 2,0	0,5 + 1,3 0,5 + 0,5	0,5%= est. Working time reduction 1,3 in 01= This is the figure of local distributed wage increase 2001 0,5% 02= This is the estimated figure by the central parties on local distributed wage increase on top of the Nat. agreement.	<b>01: 4,1</b> <b>02: 3,0</b>	
S/ SIFI	01 02	2,8 2,5	0,5 0,5	Reduction working time Reduction working time Not estimated. Vocational training is an investment, not a cost	<b>01: 4,36</b> <b>02: 3,0</b>	
NL	01 02	3,45 -	Voc. Training, religious holidays		<b>01: 3,45</b> <b>02: -</b>	
CH	01 02	Wage negotiations on enterprise level only				
NOR	01 02	5,1 4,8	In 01: 0,4% cause of more holidays		<b>01: 5,1</b> <b>02: 4,8</b>	

EUCOB@ Table 15a: EMF co-ordination rule and p+i: 2000																			
	B	DK	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	A	P	FIN/ Metal	FIN TL, STL	S/ Metall	S/ SIFI	UK	CH	NOR	
P + i	5,1	4,9	3,4	7,3	4,5	2,7	11,6	3,6	3,4	4,5	4,4	6,6	6,6	2,8	2,8	2,8			
Vowa	3,2	4,1	3,3	5,0			5,5	1,2	3,8	2,9	3,5	3,8	3,8	2,8	3,5			5,4	

Source: EMF, Eucob@ report 2000/2001; p+i was updated by the Commission's economic forecasts in December 2001

EUCOB@ Table 15b: EMF coordination rule and p+i: 2001																			
	B	DK	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	A	P	FIN/ Metal	FIN TL, STL	S/ Metall	S/ SIFI	UK	CH	NOR	
P + i	2,0	3,1	2,5	8,1	3,1	1,6	6,6	2,4	4,5	2,3	4,4	2,3	2,3	2,1	2,1	2,6			
Vowa	4,57	4,1	2,4	5,0			4,0	1,75	3,45	2,9	3,7	2,4	2,9	4,1	3,36			5,1	

EUCOB@ Table 15c: EMF coordination rule and p+i 2002																			
	B	DK	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	NL	A	P	FIN/ Metal	FIN TL, STL	S/ Metall	S/ SIFI	UK	CH	NOR	
P + i	2,4	4,0	2,3	6,9	4,1	2,2	6,8	2,0	3,8	2,5	3,5	3,1	3,1	3,6	3,6	2,1		4,0*	
Vowa	3,87		4,0	3,0				1,75	3,4	2,6/ 2,5	4,1	3,2	2,6	3,0	3,0			4,8	

\* Based on Norge Bank figures

The next step we have to deal with is the evaluation of the co-ordination rule. Firstly, we can establish that all the EMF affiliates concluded agreements that were higher than the inflation rate. The member organisations were successful not only in concluding agreements that were in line with the inflation rate but in concluding agreements that were above inflation in 2001. Therefore one basic aim in the current collective bargaining rounds throughout Europe was reached. In 2002 we have a similar picture but **Italy** for instance is not completely in line with the increase in inflation.

The EMF co-ordination rule states that the main reference points should be maintaining purchasing power and achieving a balanced participation in productivity increases. Therefore we have in a second step analysed the inflation rate (i) and labour productivity (p). If we add both figures (p+i) we have a basis for comparison with the "value of the whole agreement" (vowa). The EMF co-ordination rule also

states that on the basis of the sovereignty of the individual unions it is up to them to decide in which way to take up the leeway of bargaining; different elements are mentioned, i.e. income redistribution, improved wages and salaries, job-creation, including training and reduced working time, new forms of work organisation, fostering equal opportunities and early retirement.

**Eucob@ table 16:  
The EMF Co-ordination Rule in Action: Overview 2001/2002**

y/rule	vowa $\geq$ p+i	vowa < p+i
2001	<b>Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Finland, Sweden, (Norway)</b>	<b>Netherlands, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal</b>
2002	<b>Belgium, Germany, Austria, Finland (Metalli), Portugal, Norway</b>	<b>Finland (S, STL), Netherlands, Italy, Greece, Sweden</b>

No figures from France and Spain in 2001; no figures available for Denmark in 2002

The inflation and productivity data are all from the Commission's autumn forecast 2002 (published in November 2002), so we have a slightly different picture than in our last report. According to this data 7 countries were in line with the co-ordination rule and 5 reporting countries were not in 2001. **Italy** (-0,6) and **Portugal** (-0,7) were still in a "corridor" of  $-1,0\%$ , whilst the **Netherlands** (-1,0), **Greece** (-3,1) and **Ireland** (-2,6) remained below that corridor. The "corridor" category is not part of the official EMF co-ordination policy. We use it in this case to show that falling below the co-ordination rule is not necessarily that dramatic. This has to do with changing economic parameters after agreements were concluded. As a matter of fact this was the case as a result of the economic slowdown in Europe. Due to these effects last year's expected changes for the better could not be achieved in **Italy**. But being below the co-ordination rule by over minus 1% - that **is** below the co-ordination rule.

In 2001 **Belgium** had a vowa-figure of 4,57% that is well above the p+i figure of 2,0%. We had a similar situation in **Denmark** with a vowa-figure of 4,1% and p+i-figure of 3,1%. This result was mainly the result of an average increase at company level. In **Finland** all trade unions were above the co-ordination rule (Metalli +0,1; TL, STL, IL and TEK: +0,6). **Germany** was just in line with the co-ordination rule (2.4-2.5%). **Austria** is above the coordination rule by 0.6%. In **Sweden** both trade unions' vowa figures were well above p+i (+2,0 Svenska Metall, +1,2% SIF). We have no detailed figures from **Norway** but with a vowa-figure of 5,1 it was in line with the co-ordination rule.

In 2002 six countries (**Belgium, Austria, Germany, Finland (Metalli), Portugal and Norway**) are above the co-ordination rule (in the case of Norway we took the figures from the Norwegian central bank, which differ from the Eurostat data, but **Norway** is anyhow well above the co-ordination rule). Five countries are below: **Netherlands, Finland/TL, STL, IL and TEK, Italy, Greece and Sweden**, but only one country (**Greece** - 3.9%) remains below the corridor of  $-1,0\%$ .

The picture is better than what we expected one year ago, but as said earlier these changes to the better are resulting from deteriorating macro-economic data. This is the only reason for **Germany** being in line with the co-ordination rule in 2001, as well as **Austria**. For other countries it is getting worse (like the **Netherlands** with more than  $-1,0\%$ ). In 2002 these changes are more dramatic: we only had three countries in line with the co-ordination rule before (**Belgium, Germany and Norway**), and now we have 6. This means that **Austria, Finland (Metalli) and Portugal** are now in line with the co-ordination rule due to deteriorating

macro-economic figures. We should be aware of the fact that the causes of these changes are ones that no trade union could really be happy with. The deteriorating economic environment in Europe will probably cause problems for collective bargaining in Europe next year.

## 7.2. Current situation regarding the Co-ordination Rule

This report deals with the first years of the European Co-ordination rule in action, and though it is concluded above that the rule has been a political success seen in a wider perspective, a number of initiatives still needs to be made to maintain the impetus of the co-ordination process.

**Eucob@ table 17:  
The EMF Co-ordination Rule in Action: 4 years Overview**

y/rule	vowa $\geq$ p+i	vowa $<$ p+i
1999	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the UK	Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Switzerland
2000	Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (SIF)	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden (Svenska Metall), Switzerland and the UK
2001	Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Finland, Sweden, (Norway)	Netherlands, Greece, Italy, Ireland and Portugal
2002	Belgium, Germany, Austria, Finland (Metalli), Portugal and Norway	Finland (S, STL), Netherlands, Greece, Italy and Sweden

1999: No figures from France; 2000: no figures from Spain.

We can summarise our experience with the co-ordination rule in the first years as follows:

- In **1999** most of the countries (10) were in line with the productivity/inflation development, but 5 were not.
- In **2000** the picture was changing, three countries were in line with the co-ordination rule, but the majority of 13 reporting countries were not. In **Sweden** the picture differed between white- and blue-collar workers. In some countries the vowa figures were below the p+i, but very close to it, as in the case of **Denmark** and **Germany**.
- In **2001** 7 countries were in line with the co-ordination rule and 5 reporting countries were not. Three countries (**Italy**, the **Netherlands** and **Portugal**) were in a "corridor" of  $-1,0$  per cent, while this was not the case in **Greece** and **Ireland**.
- In **2002** 6 countries are in line the co-ordination rule and 5 reporting countries are not. (In **Finland** the metalworkers' trade union (Metalli) is in line whereas the white-collar workers' unions are not.) The other reporting countries are below the co-ordination rule, but only one country (**Greece**  $- 3.9\%$ ) remains below the corridor of  $-1.0\%$ .

We would again point out that if in 2001 and 2002 the picture changes for the better this is only because of the deteriorating economic environment in Europe. This is good news for our co-ordination rule but it is obviously not satisfactory. In general these figures go to prove the problems trade unions have to face in a Europe dominated by one currency. These figures are important, but they are only one side of the 'co-ordination medal'. The other side is the political impact on the EMF policy as a whole and the policies of the EMF affiliates. In our report on the "evaluation of the co-ordination rule" presented at the Collective Bargaining Conference in Oslo in 2001, it was pointed out that under "the publicised considerations for the co-ordination rules in the individual collective bargaining situations of the EMF affiliates, the effect of the co-ordination rule has been limited. In few meetings has the co-ordination rule been used as a key argument for a specific set of bargaining demands". But, it was also stressed that this "way of looking at the rule is however much too narrow."

The basic impact of the EMF co-ordination rule has been to establish a moral claim, that no negotiations are a national issue alone, but that all have implications beyond the national borders, and consequently that they are a shared responsibility. The first crucial test for the EMF co-ordination policy was the strike in **Germany** this spring. We organised an immediate exchange of information during the strike via the Eucob@ information system, as well as a joint EMF and IG Metall press conference in Frankfurt, and the EMF launched an action plan to support the IG Metall strike. These activities prove that co-ordination in the EMF is working very well in a *political sense*, but there is a lot to do nevertheless to arrive at a well-established European co-ordination policy.

Other examples also demonstrate that our reporting system is becoming more and more an element of national bargaining rounds. In this sense **Austria** reports that at a crucial stage during the bargaining round eucob@ correspondents from Belgium and Italy provided the Austrian colleagues with valuable information about shift regulations in their collective agreements. These examples prove that eucob@ is a system not only for ensuring that the coordination rule is operative but also for maintaining European solidarity.

## **PART IV: Central and Eastern European Countries**

### **8. The Central European Countries**

We have received reports from two countries only (**Czech Republic** (4 sector reports) and **Slovenia**). We hope to change this in the next Annual Report. Fortunately important data is available. The European Trade Union Institute organised a seminar on wage formation in the candidate countries on April 2002. Two reports were published for this meeting: a literature review by *Béla Galgóczi*, and a report analysing answers to a questionnaire (by *Emmanuel Mermet*) quite similar to this eucob@ report. Both of these excellent reports give a good overview of what is going on in the CEEC. In Ch. 8.1 we give a short overview of the macro-economic data and in Ch. 8.2 a summary of *Emmanuel Mermet's* analysis.

#### **8.1. Economic development**

The Commission has had to revise the economic forecast because the international economic environment has considerably deteriorated. GDP growth in the candidate countries was going down markedly in 2001 and 2002, but a return to higher growth levels is expected in 2003.

<b>Eucob@ table 18: Macro-economic data Central and Eastern European Countries and Transition Accession Countries 2001-2002</b>				
<i>Country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>GDP</i>	<i>Inflation</i>	<i>Unemployment</i>
<b>Bulgaria</b>	01	4,2	7,5	18,3
	02	3,6	5,5	18,6
<b>Czech Republic</b>	01	3,5	4,6	8,4
	02	3,8	4,5	7,9
<b>Estonia</b>	01	5,3	5,9	13,5
	02	4,7	4,2	13,2
<b>Hungary</b>	01	3,8	9,1	5,9
	02	3,2	5,7	5,8
<b>Latvia</b>	01	7,9	2,5	12,9
	02	4,5	3,0	12,4
<b>Lithuania</b>	01	4,5	1,4	12,5
	02	3,5	2,8	12,4
<b>Poland</b>	01	1,5	5,6	18,6
	02	1,9	4,7	19,3
<b>Romania</b>	01	4,6	34,1	6,9
	02	4,4	26,0	7,2
<b>Slovakia</b>	01	2,7	7,4	18,8
	02	3,5	6,3	18,5
<b>Slovenia</b>	01	3,7	8,5	6,8
	02	3,3	6,5	6,8
<b>Transition accession countries</b>				
<b>Cyprus</b>	01	4,0	1,8	4,8
	02	3,3	3,5	4,8
<b>Malta</b>	01	2,4	2,2	6,0
	02	3,3	2,2	6,1
<b>Turkey</b>	01	-6,8	54,5	10,8
	02	2,7	54,0	11,1

Source: European Economy, Economic Reform Monitor, Issue 2001/4, November 2001, Autumn 2001 Forecast


## 8.2. Wage policy in the CEEC

The ETUI's analysis is based on a questionnaire answered by all CEEC (except Latvia and Romania) and Malta from the transition accession countries. We are interested in four aspects in accordance with the structure of the EMF eucob@ report: the main types of agreements and coverage, discussions with the government on wage issues, the importance of the formula "inflation plus productivity" and the effects of EU enlargement on social dialogue and collective bargaining.

### Main types of agreements, coverage

The ETUI report defines three levels of bargaining, a national interprofessional level (centralised), a sector level and the enterprise level (decentralised). The main bargaining level in the CEEC is at company level. What is important for the EMF affiliates is the „*lower importance of the sector level* in candidate countries.“ (Mermet 2002: 8). As we all know the basic feature of the other EMF member organisations is a two-level system (national/sector and company level). This we should keep in mind when comparing collective bargaining systems.

In most CEEC there are no national frameworks for collective bargaining. In the **Czech Republic** there is no national framework but regulations on minimum wage. A similar situation exists in **Slovakia** but here sector bargaining is relatively independent. In **Slovenia** a striking feature is the hierarchy of agreements; agreements on wage policy for 1999-2001 and 2002-2004 exist here.

**Eucob@ table 19: Coverage of Collective Agreements**

*BG: 83% of CITUB members*

*PL: Sectors: 20%, Enterprise-level: 40-50%*

*CY: From 30% (agriculture) to 60% (tourism), 75% (clothing), 99% (banking)*

*Source: Mermet 2002.*

In almost all CEEC „trade unions have discussions on wages in formal *tripartite bodies* (Commissions, Councils...) or informal tripartite meetings. However, these meetings or bodies chiefly focus on the setting of the minimum wage rather than on the indication of an optimal or maximal wage rise at macroeconomic level.“ (Mermet 2002: 6)

### **Role of the formula “inflation plus productivity”**

The productivity plus inflation-formula is important for the EMF policy because this is the basis for the EMF co-ordination rule since 1998. ETUI concludes that there „is not any formula of this kind which is properly defined so far. However, most trade unions use inflation as a first wage demand, and other indicators such as GDP, productivity, efficiency, the economic situation of the enterprise.“ (ibid.) And trade unions from the Czech Republic and Slovenia are very much in favour of this formula.

### **Effects of EU enlargement on social dialogue / collective bargaining**

The ETUI reports on two contradictory developments: the first and the most frequent is that trade unions use EU social norms as a benchmark and that the EU “*acquis communautaire*” has an impact on candidate countries’ legislation. Recognition of ILO conventions and the European Charter (parts of) is important too, and EU-funded projects to install sector social dialogue (ibid.) The negative development is that the effects of the European Social Model on industrial relations in the CEEC are up to now very limited. There is reported pressure on working conditions to catch up with EU harmonisation criteria.

In the **Czech Republic** „EU accession and implementation of the “*acquis communautaire*” have a considerable impact on legislation: new provisions on information and consultation of employees or representatives, participation in decision-making bodies, works councils with no union representative.“ (ibid.)

In **Slovakia** it is the law that is the basic instrument that could promote social dialogue but there is no relevant impact up to now.

In **Slovenia** there is good influence coming from the European Social Model but there are no legally binding agreements. There is reported pressure for being competitive, and a reduction in workers’ protection due to EU harmonisation. (ibid.)

These reports do not give us therefore an overview about collective bargaining, but they should open political discussions concerning the impact of EU harmonisation on the CEEC.

As mentioned above we only received reports from two countries (**Czech Republic** and **Slovenia**) and we mention also the last report from **Slovakia**. The **Czech Republic** (steel) reported that an amendment to the collective agreement has been negotiated for the very first time in the case of a 3-year agreement. Some company agreements in the foundry sector have not been concluded and that will increase the importance of the sector agreement. **Slovenia** reported that SKEI used trade union fighting tools.

<b>Eucob@ table 20: Collective Bargaining in the CEEC</b>					
<i>Country</i>	<i>Organisa- tion</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>Wage Policy</i>		<i>Details and other Elements</i>
			Nat.	Local/Comp.	
<b>Bulgaria</b>					
<b>Czech Rep: Aircraft prod</b>	OS KOVO	02	4,0		Increase of minimum wage rates by 5 % and of average wage by 4 %.
<b>Steel</b>	OS KOVO	01-03	5,5		10%increase in minimum wage
<b>Foundry</b>	OS KOVO	01			Average wage increase in individual companies, 14% increase inf minimum wage rates
<b>Electronics</b>	OS KOVO	01-02			Increase of minimum wage rates of 14 %. Increase of average wage of 3 % in individual companies.
<b>Estonia</b>					
<b>Hungary</b>					
<b>Latvia</b>					
<b>Lithuania</b>					
<b>Poland</b>					
<b>Romania</b>					
<b>Slovakia: Electro</b>	OZ KOVO	99-01	Betw. 5-10,5		
<b>Metall</b>	OZ KOVO	99-01	8,0		
<b>Engineer.</b>	OZ KOVO	99-01	8,0-11,0		Minimum wage increase 11%
<b>Slovenia</b>	SKEI	00-02	01: 9,1 02: 2,7 % + 14,50 EUR (3%)		

Data from Slovakia see, eucob@ report 2000/2001

## Appendix 1

### Wage Negotiation Procedures in the Member States

*Centralised Wage Setting:* The dominant level of wage negotiations is Sectoral/Intersectoral.

*Mixed Wage Setting:* Both Sectoral/Intersectoral and Company levels of wage negotiations are important.

*Decentralised Wage Setting:* Wage negotiations mainly take place at the Company level.

**Belgium** *Mixed wage setting* - The new framework inter-professional agreement of December 2000, caps increases in nominal wages to 6.4% for 2001-2002 compared to 5.9% in the previous agreement 1999-2000. It allows also for more flexibility in adapting wages to sector specificity.

**Denmark** *Mixed wage setting* – Private sector agreements include an additional week of paid holidays and a rise in employers' social security contributions. Wage negotiations for the public sector took place during spring 2002.

**Germany** *Mixed wage setting* - In 2002, wage agreements end for practically all sectors. Difficult negotiations are under way for the metalworking, electronics, as well as the chemical industries and the construction sector. The metalworkers' union (IGM) and the union covering the mining and chemical industry (IGBCE) are about to demand wage hikes of 6.5% and 5.5%, respectively. Public sector negotiations will take place in autumn.

**Greece** *Mixed wage setting* – Sectoral and regional agreements are based on the framework two-year agreement, setting minimum wage increases. The benchmark is the public sector wage claim of 3.3% for 2002.

**Spain** *Mixed wage setting* – A national wage agreement between trade unions and the national employers' association was reached in December 2001 in order to keep wage growth through collective bargaining within a range of 2-3% during the current year.

**France** *Decentralised wage setting* - The latest wage round in the public sector ended without complete agreement between unions and the government. The latter announced a rise in civil servants' wages of 1.2% for 2001 and 2002. Unions claimed for a higher increase.

**Ireland** *Centralised wage setting* – A national agreement with the trade unions provides for a 17% increase in basic pay over the 33 months from April 2000 to December 2002 for the private sector and from October 2000 to June 2003 for the public sector.

**Italy** *Mixed wage setting* – In January 2002 the percentage of wage agreements due for renewal, measured in terms of contractual compensations, increased to 65.5% up from 4.7% in December. In 2002 as a whole, contractual wages are forecast to increase between 2.5% and 3%.

**Luxembourg** *Mixed wage setting* – Wages per employee rose by 5.3% in 2001 after 4.3% in 2000. The increase might slow down slightly in 2002 as inflation is slowing down and wages are formally linked to the consumer price index.

**Netherlands** *Decentralised wage setting* – Collective agreements have already been signed for the whole year 2000 for about 25% of employees in the private sector, providing an average 4.0% annual rise in contractual wages.

**Austria** *Mixed wage setting* – For 2002, wage agreements between 0.8% in the public sector and 2.9% in the metal industry.

**Portugal** *Mixed wage setting* – For 2002, wages scales in the government sector were raised by 2¾%. Wages of employees per head are forecast to increase by around 4.5% in 2002.

**Finland** *Centralised wage setting* – In December 2000 the social partners reached a two-year wage agreement awarding a general increase of 3.1% in 2001 and 2.3% in 2002 covering about 95% of salary earners. A wage drift of well above 1% led to an average wage rise of 4.5% in 2001.

**Sweden** *Mixed wage setting* – Wage agreements from 2001, assisted by the Mediation Authority, are in place for most of the labour market until 2004. Wages are forecast to increase by around 4% in 2002.

**United Kingdom:** *Decentralised wage setting* – Wages of employees per head are forecast to increase by around 4.5% in 2002.

Source: European Economy, Economic forecasts spring 2002, No. 2

## Appendix II: List of the Correspondents of the Eucob@ Network

Country	Organisation	Name	e-mail
A	GMBE	Anderle, Manfred	<a href="mailto:Manfred_Anderle@gmbe.oegb.or.at">Manfred_Anderle@gmbe.oegb.or.at</a>
B	CMB	Biebaut, Frans	<a href="mailto:fbiebaut@abvmetaal.org">fbiebaut@abvmetaal.org</a>
B	CCMB	Diesbecq, Nathalie	<a href="mailto:ccmb@acv.csc.be">ccmb@acv.csc.be</a>
CZE	OS KOVO	Soucek, Jaroslav	<a href="mailto:Studnicna.Lucie@cmkos.cz">Studnicna.Lucie@cmkos.cz</a>
DK	CO-Industri	Bundvad, Jens	<a href="mailto:jb@co-industri.dk">jb@co-industri.dk</a>
DK	IDA	Ostergaard, Christel	<a href="mailto:COE@IDA.DK">COE@IDA.DK</a>
FIN	Metalli	Löhman, Jorma	<a href="mailto:jorma.lohman@metallilitto.fi">jorma.lohman@metallilitto.fi</a>
F	FGMM CFDT	Landas, Blandine	<a href="mailto:blandine.landas@fgmm.cfdt.fr">blandine.landas@fgmm.cfdt.fr</a>
D	IG Metall	Schroeder, Wolfgang	<a href="mailto:Wolfgang.schroeder@igmetall.de">Wolfgang.schroeder@igmetall.de</a>
NL	FNV	Berghuis, Jan	<a href="mailto:linepaul@bg.fnv.nl">linepaul@bg.fnv.nl</a>
IRL	SIPTU	McCartney, John	<a href="mailto:jmccartney@SIPTU.ie">jmccartney@SIPTU.ie</a>
I	FIOM	Petrucci, Sabina	<a href="mailto:FIOM.INTERNAZIONALE@MAIL.CGIL.it">FIOM.INTERNAZIONALE@MAIL.CGIL.it</a>
I	FIM	Martinelli, Paola	<a href="mailto:FIMCAE@tin.it">FIMCAE@tin.it</a>
NOR	Fellesforbundet	Sjovoll, Hallstein	<a href="mailto:hallstein.sjovoll@fellesforbundet.no">hallstein.sjovoll@fellesforbundet.no</a>
NOR	NITO	Breen, Lasse	<a href="mailto:lasse.breen@nito.no">lasse.breen@nito.no</a>
NOR	EL&IT	Andersen, Jan O.	<a href="mailto:jan.andersen@elogit.no">jan.andersen@elogit.no</a>
P	SIMA	Simoës, José	<a href="mailto:SIMA@net.vodafone.pt">SIMA@net.vodafone.pt</a>
P	Fequimetal	Balecho, José	<a href="mailto:Fequimetal@mail.sitepac.pt">Fequimetal@mail.sitepac.pt</a>
SLK	OZ KOVO	Mifka, Anton	<a href="mailto:adriana@ozkovo.sk">adriana@ozkovo.sk</a>
E	CC.OO.	Moreno Preciado, Rita	<a href="mailto:josette@fm.ccoo.es">josette@fm.ccoo.es</a>
E	ELA-Metal	Llabori, Jon Ander	<a href="mailto:fundm001@sarenet.es">fundm001@sarenet.es</a>
E	UGT-MCA	Magán Moreno, Isabel	<a href="mailto:sgeneral@mca.ugt.org">sgeneral@mca.ugt.org</a>
S	Metall	Nilsson, Roger	<a href="mailto:roger.nilsson.fk@metall.se">roger.nilsson.fk@metall.se</a>
S	SIF	Sellgren, Tore	<a href="mailto:tore.sellgren@sif.se">tore.sellgren@sif.se</a>
S	CF	Brandt, Mikael	<a href="mailto:mikael.brandt@cf.se">mikael.brandt@cf.se</a>
CH	SMUV	Ambrosetti, Renzo	<a href="mailto:jolanda.nasi@smuv.ch">jolanda.nasi@smuv.ch</a>
UK	AEEU	Methven, Ian	<a href="mailto:I.Methven@headoffice.aeeu.org.uk">I.Methven@headoffice.aeeu.org.uk</a>
<b>Non-active members on the mailing-list:</b>			
NL	FNV	Jacqui van Stigt	<a href="mailto:JacqStig@bg.fnv.nl">JacqStig@bg.fnv.nl</a>
D	IG Metall	Schild, Armin	<a href="mailto:Schild.armin@igmetall.de">Schild.armin@igmetall.de</a>
S	Metall	Persson, Gina	<a href="mailto:gina.person.fk@metall.se">gina.person.fk@metall.se</a>
	Metall	Nilsson, Göran	<a href="mailto:goran.nilsson.fk@metall.se">goran.nilsson.fk@metall.se</a>
	Metall	Olsson, Jan-Ake	<a href="mailto:jan-ake.olsson.fk@metall.se">jan-ake.olsson.fk@metall.se</a>
EMF		Samyn, Bart	<a href="mailto:bsamyn@emf-fem.org">bsamyn@emf-fem.org</a>
		Kuhlmann, Reinhard	<a href="mailto:rkuhlmann@emf-fem.org">rkuhlmann@emf-fem.org</a>
IMF		Mureau, Anne-Marie	<a href="mailto:ammureau@imfmetal.org">ammureau@imfmetal.org</a>