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European Collective Bargaining Information Network

### **Collective bargaining policy in the European metal industry 1999/2000** (annual report, concluded at the end of March 2000)

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## 1. Preface

Pursuant to the collective bargaining policy action program presented at its 3rd Collective Bargaining Policy Conference held in 1998, the EMF is endeavoring to closely coordinate the collective bargaining policies of its member organizations. To compile the information necessary for achieving this aim, the member organizations have committed themselves to report back regularly on their collective bargaining policy activities and relate what they have managed to achieve.

On this basis, with the backing of IG Metall, the select working group of the EMF's Collective Bargaining Committee started drawing up a concept for a European Collective Bargaining Information Network (EUCOBA). That concept was adopted by the EMF's Collective Bargaining Committee in November 1999. The first step taken involved the establishment of a collective bargaining policy reporting system and the drafting of a first collective bargaining report 1999/2000, which is presented here.

### Key elements of the EUCOBA concept:

- EUCOBA will use new communication media and be present on the Internet, namely on the EMF's home page. Until this is possible, information will primarily be exchanged via e-mail.
- EUCOBA is to be based on two pillars:
  1. an up-to-date, continuous and systematic reporting system
  2. ongoing data appraisal and analysis, presentation of overviews
- EUCOBA will be built up in stages:
 

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| <u>Contents:</u>  | 1. Collation and appraisal of collective bargaining standards |
|                   | 2. Macroeconomic data   |
| <u>Procedure:</u> | 1. Reporting system   |
|                   | 2. Appraisal; analysis; overview.                             |

### Key elements of the reporting system:

- A network of "responsible correspondents" will submit regular reports on recently concluded collective agreements and ongoing bargaining situations.
- A uniform structure for reporting will open up a broad range of analytic possibilities.
- Aims: continuity in the exchange of information and analysis; up-to-date information; clear presentation of data in a readily understandable form

- The project will also aim to ensure the member organizations' active participation as users and suppliers of information.

At the November 1999 meeting of the EMF's Collective Bargaining Committee, more than 20 EMF member organizations stated their willingness to take part in EUCOBA, appoint responsible correspondents and regularly report on any freshly concluded collective agreements.

The conditions for participating in EUCOBA were made highly restrictive, it being stipulated that only those organizations which honour their information-related obligations will receive information in return. In practice, this means that should a particular organization fail to produce a report, it would (at least temporarily) be excluded from the information network.

The first round of reporting should be concluded relatively quickly so as to enable an initial analysis of the reports and the drafting of conclusions and proposals for improvement for future reports before the end of the project.

## **2. Reporting requirements**

This is the basis on which the first reports on currently valid collective agreements will be drawn up, using a framework report as a guide.

On the one hand this outline report should be as open as possible, so as to take account of national peculiarities and multicultural variety in Europe. On the other hand it should establish a certain generally binding standard. There are two reasons why such a standard would be useful: firstly the quality of information is an essential prerequisite for any project that has been designed to be ongoing. Only if the users find the information they are offered both interesting and useful will they be prepared to make their own contribution towards it in the longer term.

Secondly, only if the reports are partially standardized can a certain level of comparability be attained. Comparability makes sense particularly when the reports in question are not viewed in isolation, but are also to be assessed and analysed. Once the production of a regular and continual flow of reports stabilizes, an unprecedented pool of material will be created that will constitute an excellent basis for a (long-term) panel study. However, certain preconditions would have to be met first.

The framework report should stipulate the following tasks:

- Framework: 1. At the beginning it should be stated clearly in which country at which time (in future this should always be reported on an ongoing basis) a collective agreement has been concluded on which topic (where? when? what?)

2. Furthermore, it should be explained, which union(s) managed to secure results at which level (in both geographically defined and sectoral terms) for how long a period and also whether (and if so, how) the described agreement has a significance extending beyond the specific area it covers (pilot function).

- The core of the report should comprise the description of the outcome of any negotiations against the backdrop (including basic figures and assessments) of the economic situation in the countries in question (inflation, productivity, employment, and so on) and the respective preconditions for political implementation (demands, progress of negotiations, political implications, ways of exerting pressure and trends governing their use).

### 3. The participants

There is considerable interest in EUCOBA: in all, 29 representatives of organizations from 17 countries have been included as "responsible correspondents" in the list of e-mail subscribers (mailing list).<sup>1</sup>

Practical involvement has been moderated by EUCOBA and progress made after an intensive communication process with the correspondents. As a result, within three months 25 collective bargaining reports have been received from 16 different countries.<sup>2</sup> In addition, we have received 4 up-to-date Info news bulletins about interesting bargaining situations.

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<sup>1</sup> If different organizations are involved in one particular country, they may decide whether they want to draw up a joint report (like CMB and CCMB in Belgium, for example), or have each organization submit its own separate report (as with Svenska Metall, SIF and CF in Sweden, for instance). However, joint reports should be declared as such by all those involved. Another possible way of sharing the workload is taking shape in Italy, where the core report was written by FIOM-CGIL, whilst FIM-CISL has now pledged to produce a report on company-internal negotiations.

The mailing list also includes various other persons without any obligations (e.g. the representatives of IMF and Nordic Metall). No decision has yet been taken regarding possible punishments for organizations that fail to make a contribution.

<sup>2</sup> The first edition of this document was published at the end of March. The actual edition is taking in account requests for corrections from the participating countries but not the new contribution from AEEU (UK) that arrived after the meeting of Collective Bargaining Committee at 4./5. April at Brussels.

EUCOBA's working language is English. Most of the reports sent in have been written in English, a few others had to be translated. Efforts will be made to make the member organizations themselves responsible for such translations and ensure that their reports are submitted in English.

#### **4. Analysis of the first reports 1999/2000: questions**

Above, the quality and comparability of information were defined as key criteria. The aim of the following analysis of the reports is to assess how the contributions of the first series of reports from 1999 match up to these criteria. The question is this: what is the overall message of the reports? What kind of information do they provide? Which questions about the current collective bargaining situation in Europe can they answer? What are the limitations of such reports? What improvements have to be made to meet the set objectives?

In general, the submitted reports were all both meticulously drawn up and informative. For the most part the authors stuck within the prescribed framework. Nevertheless, the reports are so different and wide-ranging that they only permit limited possibilities for comparison. The variety in the reports not only reflects the different qualities of the systems in question, but also different main areas of subjective interest. Of course, there can be no question of standardizing the country reports in such a way that they filter out national and cultural peculiarities. However, there must be extensive harmonization with respect to certain specific questions, so as to guarantee comparability and analytical possibilities for a (long-term) panel study.

The reports are analyzed in line with the framework, if not in sequential terms, at least with respect to the main points covered: the 'core' part of the reports, namely the description of what has actually been achieved, is followed by the systematic listing of where collective agreements have been concluded, and finally by an attempt to throw some light on the political and economic background of the agreements in question.

#### **5. Classification of collective agreements**

##### **5.1. Collective bargaining calendar 1999/2000**

An overview of the duration of the various collective agreements and the various dates set for negotiations in the individual countries are prerequisites for the coordination of collective bargaining policy (cf. EMF Action Program).

For the first time a "collective bargaining calendar" was drawn up, specifying the temporal framework within which the current collective agreements are valid and when

the next round of bargaining is scheduled to take place. This overview of collective bargaining dates will also enable EUCOBA always to request that reports be submitted just in time.

| <b>EUCOBA Table 1: European Collective Bargaining Calendar (March 2000)</b> |                            |                                 |           |               |                          |  |                  |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------|---------------|--------------------------|--|------------------|
| <b>Country and organization</b>   |                            | <b>actual agreements valid:</b> |           | <b>terms</b>  | <b>next negotiation:</b> |  | <b>current</b>   |
|   |                            | <b>from</b>                     | <b>to</b> | <b>(year)</b> | <b>start</b>             | <b>expected end</b>                              | <b>situation</b> |
| <b>aus</b>  | GMBE                       | 1 nov 99                        | not fixed | 1             | sept 00                  | oct/nov 00                                       |                  |
| <b>bel</b>  | CMB, CCMB                  | 1 jan 99                        | 31 dec 00 | 2             | jan 01                   | jun 01   |                  |
| <b>cze</b>  | OS KOVO                    | 1 jan 99                        | 31 dec 99 | 1             | nov 99                   | dec 99 - mar 00                                  | ?                |
|   | <i>local/company level</i> |                                 |           | 1             |                          |  |                  |
| <b>dan</b>  | CO-Industri                | 1 mar 00                        | 1 mar 04  | 4             | jan 04                   |  |                  |
|   | <i>local/company level</i> |                                 |           | 1             |                          |  |                  |
| <b>fin</b>  | Metalli                    | 15 jan 00                       | 31 jan 01 | 1             | dec 00                   | feb/mar 01                                       |                  |
|   | STL,TL,IL, TEK             | 2 jan 00                        | 31 jan 01 | 1             | dec 00                   | jan 01   |                  |
|   | <i>local/company level</i> |                                 |           |               |                          |  |                  |
| <b>fra</b>  |                            |                                 |           | 1             |                          |  |                  |
| <b>ger</b>  | IG Metall                  | 1 jan 99                        | 29 feb 00 | 1             | 15 feb 00                | mar/apr 00                                       | ongoing talks    |
| <b>hol</b>  | FNV                        | apr 1998                        | jun 00    | 2             |                          |  | ?                |
| <b>irl</b>  | ICTU (SIPTU)               | apr 00                          | dec 02    | ca. 3         | oct 02                   | dec 02   |                  |
| <b>ita</b>  | FIOM, FIM, UILM            | 1 jan 99                        | 31 dec 02 | 4             |                          |  |                  |
|   | <i>Local/company level</i> |                                 | 2000      | 4             | 2000                     | Negotiations ongoing                             | ?                |
| <b>nor</b>  | Fellesforbundet            | 1 apr 98                        | 30 mar 00 | 2             | mar 00                   | apr/may 00                                       | ?                |
|   | NITO                       | 1 jun 98                        | 31 may 00 | 2             | jun 00                   | oct/nov 00                                       |                  |
|   | <i>Local/company level</i> | jul 99                          | jun 99    | 1             |                          | jun 00   | ?                |
| <b>por</b>  | fequimetal                 | 1988/99                         |           | 1             |                          |  | ?                |
| <b>slk</b>  | OZ KOVO                    | 1 jan 99                        | 31 dec 01 |               |                          |  |                  |
|   | <i>wage</i>                |                                 |           |               | 1 nov each year          | 2 subsectors concluded<br>3 still in negotiation | ?                |
| <b>spa</b>  | CC.OO, UGT                 | 1 jan 98                        | 1 jan 00  | 2             | 1 jan 00                 | 30 may 00  | ?                |
|   | ELA (Basque Country))      | 1 jan 99                        | 31 dec 00 | 2             |                          |  |                  |
| <b>swe</b>  | Metall, SIF,CF             | 1 mar 98                        | 31 jan 01 | 3             | 30 oct 00                | 31 jan 01  |                  |

|     |                            |                 |           |   |        |                  |  |
|-----|----------------------------|-----------------|-----------|---|--------|------------------|--|
|     | <i>Local/company level</i> |                 |           | 1 |        |                  |  |
| swi | SMUV                       | 1 jul 98        | 30 jun 03 | 5 | nov 02 | 30 jun 03        |  |
|     | <i>Local/company level</i> | wages each year |           | 1 |        | partly concluded |  |

## 5.2. Bargaining levels

The vast majority of collective agreements covered by the reports are multi-annual sectoral agreements concluded at national level<sup>3</sup>, dealing for the most part comprehensively with a wide range of topics (pay, working time and other matters).

| EUCOBA Table 2: bargaining levels |     |     |             |        |        |      |
|-----------------------------------|-----|-----|-------------|--------|--------|------|
|                                   | nat | reg | loc/<br>com | inter~ | sector | sub~ |
| aus                               | X   |     |             |        | X      | (6)  |
| bel                               | X   |     |             |        | X      |      |
| cze                               | 3   | 1   |             |        | 1      | 3    |
| dan                               | X   |     |             |        | X      |      |
| fin                               | X   |     |             |        | X      |      |
| fra                               | X   |     |             |        | X      |      |
| ger                               |     | 21  |             |        | X      |      |
| hol                               | X   |     |             |        | X      |      |
| irl                               | X   |     | X           | X      |        |      |

| EUCOBA Table 2: bargaining levels |     |     |             |        |        |      |
|-----------------------------------|-----|-----|-------------|--------|--------|------|
|                                   | nat | reg | loc/<br>com | inter~ | sector | sub~ |
| ita                               | X   |     |             |        | X      |      |
| nor                               | X   |     | X           |        | X      |      |
| por                               | X   |     | X           |        |        | 4    |
| slk                               | X   |     |             |        |        | X    |
| spa                               |     | X   | X           |        | X      | X    |
| spa                               |     | 7   | X           |        | X      |      |
| swe                               | X   |     |             |        | X      |      |
| swi                               |     |     | X           |        | X      |      |

However, in most countries the described level of bargaining is linked to a structured bargaining system, which assigns both a higher, inter-sectoral level and a lower, local or company level a role that is not in significant for the understanding of the described collective agreement. At the higher level, in countries like Belgium, Italy and similarly, in a recent development, also in Sweden, basic or framework agreements were concluded, which constitute the basis for the described collective agreements.

At the lower level, in virtually all countries it is possible or customary for agreements concluded at national level to be complemented by company-level agreements and

<sup>3</sup>Exceptions: Germany (regionally/centrally coordinated); Spain (no central agreement at present, rather just regional or company-level collective agreements; Switzerland (here only the company level is described); Denmark and Ireland (inter-sectoral); Czech Republic, Slovakia, Portugal (mainly sub-sectoral).

especially improved where pay-related issues are concerned. In at least half the countries these pay talks play an important role, and in Denmark and Switzerland even a really key role. However, the reports only highlight the importance of other levels of settlement on a sporadic, rather than a systematic basis. Yet the company level should be systematically incorporated into the reporting system if it is to provide an accurate reflection of reality.

### 5.3. Coverage

The political relevance of the concluded collective agreements also depends on the scope of the labour relations they cover. For instance, it is not uninteresting to note that the described contracts concluded in Belgium, Austria and the Basque country share roughly the same quantitative significance.

| EUCOBA Table 3: coverage of agreements |               |         |                       |        |
|--|---------------|---------|-----------------------|--------|
|  |               | member  | employee (indirectly) | collar |
| aus                                    | GMBE          |         | 145.000               | blue   |
| bel                                    | CMB,CCMB      |         | 144.000               | blue   |
| cze                                    | OS KOVO       |         | 92.000                | b+w    |
| dan                                    | CO.industri   |         | 300.000 (100.000)     | b+w    |
| dan                                    | IDA           | 8.000   | 80.000                | acad.  |
| fin                                    | Metalli       | 110.000 |                       | blue   |
| fin                                    | STL,TL,IL,TEK | 50.000  |                       | white  |
| fra                                    | FGMM CFDT     |         | 1.800.000             | b+w    |
| ger                                    | IG Metall     |         | 3.200.000             | b+w    |
| hol                                    | FNV           |         | 200.000               | b+w    |
| irl                                    | ICTU(SIPTU)   | 500.000 | 160.000               | b+w    |

| EUCOBA Table 3: coverage of agreements |                 |                  |                       |                |
|--|-----------------|------------------|-----------------------|----------------|
|  |                 | member           | employee (indirectly) | collar         |
| ita                                    | FIOM,FIM,UIL    |                  | 1.600.000             | b+w            |
| nor                                    | NITO            | ?                | ?                     | w-ing          |
| nor                                    | Fellesforbundet | 45.000           |                       | Blue           |
| por                                    | Fequimetal      |                  |                       |                |
| slo                                    | OZ KOVO         |                  |                       |                |
| spa                                    | F.M. CC.OO.     |                  | 1.071.000             | b+w            |
| Spa                                    | ELA             |                  | 159.000               | b+w            |
| swe                                    | SIF<br>CF       | 80.000<br>25.000 |                       | White<br>w-ing |
| swe                                    | Metall          | 181.000          |                       | Blue           |
| swi                                    | SMUV            |                  | 130.000               | b+w            |

As our overview shows, the submitted reports can only be compared in a few individual cases. Whilst three countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden) cite membership figures and other countries provide no data, most countries quote numbers of employees for whom it is often not absolutely clear whether they reflect the number of employees in the metal industry in general (as in Germany, for instance), or the people who are actually affected, as is the case in Spain, or indeed whether both these possible figures are identical, as is the case in Austria and Belgium, for example. (In Belgium collective agreements are declared generally binding by law. In Austria such a general obligation is achieved by obliging all employers to become members of the Arbeitskammer (Chamber of Labour)).

In future, three clear figures - or at least the unequivocal definition of the figure cited - will be provided. At the same time the reports should clearly state whether the described agreement applies to blue-collar workers, white-collar workers or both.

## 6. Bargaining policies and results

The main part of the collective bargaining reports concerns information on the content of collective agreements - namely current results or the outcome of the last round of negotiations. These results concern a very wide range of bargaining issues.

| EUCOBA Table 4: Main issues 1999/2000 |                              |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Country                               |                              | aus | bel | cze | dan | fin | fra | ger | hol | irl | ita | nor | por | slk | spa | swe | Swi |
| pay rise                              | pay structure                | X   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | X   |     |
|                                       | pay rise                     | X   | X   | X   |     | X   |     | X   | X   | X   | X   | X   | X   | X   | X   | X   | X   |
|                                       | minimum pay rise             |     |     |     | X   |     |     |     |     | X   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
|                                       | apprentice pay               | X   | X   |     | X   |     |     | X   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| training                              | Vocational training time     |     | X   |     |     |     |     |     | X   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
|                                       | training conditions          |     |     | X   |     |     |     |     | X   |     |     | X   |     |     |     | X   |     |
| worktime                              | Working time reduction       |     |     | X   | X   |     | X   |     |     |     | X   |     | X   | X   | X   | X   |     |
|                                       | working time flexibilization |     | X   |     | X   |     |     |     | X   |     | X   |     |     |     |     |     | X   |
| pensions                              | pension scale raise          |     |     |     | X   |     |     |     |     | X   |     | X   |     |     |     |     |     |
|                                       | early retirement             |     |     |     |     | X   |     |     | X   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | X   |
|                                       | supplementary pension scheme |     | X   |     |     |     | X   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     | X   |     |     |

- Overall, wage policy and the results achieved in connection with it are deemed most important, for it features in all the reports - with one exception - and is also dealt with at greatest length in them.

Otherwise, three more areas in particular are very frequently mentioned in the reports, and besides their quantitative significance they are obviously of key strategic importance in the collective bargaining policy conducted by the European metalworkers' unions:

- in second place comes working time (which features in 10 countries' reports);

- in third place come pensions, pension supplements and early retirement (new arrangements in 6 countries);
- closely followed by training, vocational training and continuing training (regarding which there are new arrangements in 5 countries).

## 6.1. Wage policy

The core of the reports concerns the pay rises achieved in the agreements described. The generally relatively detailed description of the special settlements reached clearly indicates that they were reached in extremely different ways in the various countries.

| EUCOBA Table 5: wage policy in the European metal industry 1999/2000 |    |           |                                 |  |   |   |
|--|----|-----------|---------------------------------|--|---|---|
|  | m  | y         | nat/reg                         | local  | other                                   | Details   |
| aus  | 12 | 00        | 1,9%                            | 0,5 %<br>allocation at<br>company<br>level                             |   | minimum wages 2,4%<br>effective wages 1,9%<br>apprentices remuneration 2,3%<br>boni 1,9%<br>distribution option 0,5%  |
| bel  | 24 | 99-<br>01 | 5,6%<br>total                   | improvement<br>possible  | (1%<br>additional<br>pension<br>scheme) | 99: 1,5 %wage increase<br>99: 1,2% inflation rate<br>00: 0,7 %wage increase<br>00: 1,2 %inflation estimated   |
| cze  | 12 | 99        | 0-6%                            | improvement<br>possible  |   | electrical industry 5%<br>aerospace 6%%<br>steel 0%   |
| dan  | 48 | 00-<br>03 | ca. 1/3<br>of<br>labour<br>cost | ca. 2/3 of<br>labour cost:<br>entire wage<br>increase                  | 1% all but<br>wages                     | minimum level of pay:<br>3/00: 82,40 Dkr<br>3/01: 84,40 Dkr<br>3/02: 86,40 Dkr<br>apprentice pay:3-4%<br>benefits 2000: 5%; 02: 2%  |
| fin-<br>metalli  | 12 | 00        | 3,1%                            | Improvement<br>possible  |   | 150 Finnish pennies/h or<br>264 FIM/month<br>*continuous shift compensation<br>incr. by 145 to 960 pennies/h<br>*evening shift compensation<br>incr. by 80 to 515 pennies/h |
| fin  | 12 | 00        | 4%<br>minimu<br>m               | improvement<br>possible -<br>partly dis-<br>tributed on<br>plant level |   | TL + STL: 3,1%;<br>general w.i. 250 FIM -<br>or at least 2,6%;<br>rest placed to tables up to 4%;<br>IL + TEK: 2,6% + 0,5% (distr.on plant l.)                              |
| ger  | 14 | 99        | 3,5%<br>(4,1x<br>12)            | Improvement<br>possible /no<br>cb on plant<br>level                    |   | 3,2% wage increase<br>350 DM 2x flat rate (3%)<br>1% lump sum<br>increase of apprentice pay   |
| hol  | 26 | 98-<br>00 | 4,2 %<br>per year<br>(?)        | wages 20-<br>25% higher<br>than nat.<br>minimum<br>standards           |   | per 7/98: 3,25% wage increase<br>per 11/98: 1% of annual wage (lump sum)<br>per 7/99: 2,7% of individual pay<br>(min: 80,63 Dfl.)<br>per 3/00: 1,5% (min. 44,64 Dfl.)       |
| irl  | 33 | 00-<br>02 | 15%                             | gain sharing<br>can be<br>negotiated                                   | minimum<br>wage: 4.40£                  | 00: 5,5% (minimum £12pw)<br>01: 5,5% (minimum £11pw)<br>02: 4% (minimum £9pw)   |

| EUCOBA Table 5: wage policy in the European metal industry 1999/2000 |       |         |   |                                   |                                      |  |
|--|-------|---------|---|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|
|  | m     | y       | nat/reg                                   | local                             | other                                | Details  |
| ita  | 48    | 99-02   | 3%  | negotiations in 2000              | lump sum                             | 3% (Lit. 85.000) for 2 years, lump sum: 120.000 Lit. after 2 years: wage increase on company level   |
| nor-fel-les  | 24    | 98-99   |   | local bargaining on wages         |                                      | 98 wage increase: 5,2%<br>97/98 inflation rate 2,3%<br>99 wage increase: 4,3%*<br>98/99 inflation rate: 2,3%*<br>* estimated                 |
| nor-nito   | 24    | 98      |   | 7% average                        |                                      | Wage negotiated only at company level  |
| por  | 24    | 98-99   |   | 5% average                        |                                      | Employers refuse central wage negotiations   |
| slk  | 36-60 | 00-diff | 2-2,5 p.a.                                | improvement possible              | compensation for injury at work: 20% | Steel: 5 years: 10,5%<br>Metallurgy: 3 years: 8%<br>(Electrical engineering, foundries; metallurgy : still being negotiated)                 |
| spa-ccoo   | 24    | 99      | 2,35% average p.a. or provincial or local |                                   | pensions                             | provincial agreements 99: 2,3%<br>company agreements 99: 2,4%  |
| spa-ela  | 24    | 99-00   | 99: 2%<br>00: 3,35%                       |                                   | 0,25% pension fund                   | 99 wage increase: 2%<br>(98 inflation 1,4% plus 0,6%)<br>00 wage increase: 3,35%<br>(99 inflation 2,8% plus 0,55%)                           |
| swe-metall   | 36    | 98-00   | 2,6<br>2,3                                | distribution of national pay rise |                                      | 1/98: wage increase 2,6%<br>1/99: wage increase 2,3%<br>1/99 + 6/00: wage reviews<br>(individual minimum:<br>1/99: 275 SEK<br>1/00: 225 SEK) |
| swe-sif + cf   | 36    | 98-00   | 2,1<br>2,1                                | distrib. of national pay rise     |                                      | 98 wage increase: 2,1%<br>99 wage increase: 2,1%<br>wage reviews (see above)   |
| swi  | 12    | 00      |   | 1-1,5 % ca. (real wages)          |                                      | Wages only negotiated at plant level   |

There is hardly any other area where an overview of the results is so unclear and difficult to compare as wage increases. If misunderstandings are to be avoided in future, then the following problems should be borne in mind:

- The periods over which the increases apply differ in length, ranging between 12 and 48 months. The percentages cited refer in some cases to one year, in others to several years and in others to other periods of time. The period over which the wage increases apply is not always clear. More precise details are needed on the correlation between the time period and pay rise. Here is one proposed method of presentation, from Germany:

| EUCOBA Table 5a: Example of a pay rise with periods indicated |      |           |
|---|------|-----------|
| total   | 3.5% | 14 months |
| 3/99 - 2/00   | 4.1% | 12 months |
| 1999  | 3.9% | 12 months |

| <b>EUCOBA Table 5a: Example of a pay rise with periods indicated</b> |      |  |
|--|------|--|
| long term  | 3.2% | (starting point for next negotiations) |

- When the national details of these wage increases are taken into account, their diversity becomes particularly striking: multi-annual agreements are mostly (but not always) designed in such a way that they provide for a multiply staggered rise (not always on a yearly basis), namely for the wage increase and in addition to compensate inflation (which is estimated and sometimes adapted to the real development of inflation, sometimes not, while in other instances it is not clear which). Sometimes, despite a multi-annual agreement, only one percentage is cited, and it remains unclear whether this refers to the full term of the agreement and is split up over the respective number of years, or whether wages go up by this percentage each year, so a specific definition of the figures cited is required.
- In the cited wage increase percentages the rise in the rate of inflation is sometimes included, sometimes not, whereas on other occasions this is unclear. There should be no problem in providing more specific definitions.
- In general the cited percentage wage increase refers to the agreements concluded at national level. Some of these percentages already include the proportion to be distributed at company level (Austria, Sweden), whereas the company-level wage increases are general wage increases (Norway, Spain, Switzerland). However, most cases involve an increase in the minimum standard wage, which may then be boosted further in different ways and to the most varied extents at company level. Only two countries stipulate how much this improvement actually brings at company level (Denmark 2/3 and the Netherlands 20-25%). What is needed here is stipulation per country as to how this dimension can be taken into account. Here is an example from Spain:

| <b>EUCOBA Table 5b: Example of wage increases at different levels of bargaining</b> |                       |                    |                  |
|---|-----------------------|--------------------|------------------|
|   | Provincial agreements | Company agreements | Sectoral average |
| Maximum increase  | 4.8%                  | 5.1%               | 5.1%             |
| Minimum increase  | 1.7%                  | 1.0%               | 1.0%             |
| Average increase  | 2.3%                  | 2.4%               | 2.35%            |

- Occasionally fixed amounts are reported in units of the respective national currency. Such amounts would be easier to interpret and compare not only if they were converted into euros, but also if they were presented as percentages.
- Sometimes cultural peculiarities, such as the "wage reviews" in Sweden, remain

unexplained, which makes them difficult to evaluate. In some cases, if only a little effort was made, readers from other countries would find these characteristics much easier to understand.

## 6.2. Working time

The topic of working time is of considerable importance: roughly three-quarters of the countries in question have adopted arrangements governing working time. These arrangements can be roughly divided into two separate categories, namely in agreements that reduce working time and agreements designed to make working time more flexible.

| EUCOBA Table 6: changing working time in the European metal industry 1999/2000 |   |   |
|--|---|---|
|  | reduction   | flexibilisation   |
| bel  |   | first system: on an annual basis the weekly workingtime is 38 hours, it can be exceeded 1h a day and 5h a week maximum.<br>Second system: weekly working time of 38 hours can be exceeded maximum 130 h, compensation within 6 months         |
| cze  | 37,5 hours a week<br>1 week of paid holiday   |   |
| dan  | 98: wo'ti reduction for 2nd and 3rd shifts from 35 to 34 hours;<br>00: extra 5 days of leave for all (total 6 weeks now)                    | 98: 1 h expansion of daily hours without bonus<br>extension of reconsiliation period from 6 to 12 months;<br>00: working time can be fixed weekly, monthly or annually;<br>in case of experiments: deviating wo'ti arrangements can be agreed |
| fin  | no reductions/ 1 day's leave  |   |
| fra  | 413 company agreements with 35 h agreed for 38.000 employees; employment effect: 15.000 jobs  | voluntary early retirement at the age of 55   |
| hol  |   | right for all employees to work part time   |
| ita  | 8h/year for shift workers   | working hours bank:<br>companies >200: 40-200 overtime hours paid at half rate<br>companies < 200: 32-250 hours paid at half from usual pay;<br>flexible working week 32-48h; 64 h per annum for seasonal production                          |
| por  | in some companies working week was cut to under 40 hours  |   |
| slk  | Increase in paid leave  |   |
| spa  | average: 1762 annual h (38,6 weekly)  |   |
|  | the trend is towards a gradual reduction of working time:<br>99: annual working time in all agreements was reduced by an average of 7 hours |   |

| EUCOBA Table 6: changing working time in the European metal industry 1999/2000 |   |                 |
|--|---|-----------------|
|  | reduction   | flexibilisation |
| spa-ela  | 99: 5h cut to 1738h annual<br>00: 5h cut to 1733h annual  |                 |
| swe  | compensatory leave for each working week (40hw; 35, 36, 38 hw shiftwork):<br>98: daytime: 39 min; two-shift: 135 min; other shiftwork 15 min<br>99: daytime: 54 min; two shift: 156 min: other shiftwork 36 min |                 |
| swe-sif+cf   | 98: reduction 15 of min/week<br>99: reduction of 15 min/week  |                 |

Surprisingly, agreements on working time reduction clearly predominate amongst those described, with 11 organizations having concluded agreements of that type. Of these, 8 have succeeded in achieving effective reductions in working time, either by prolonging paid annual leave by one week, as in Denmark and the Czech Republic, or, as in France, Spain, Portugal and, to a certain extent, Sweden, by reducing annual or weekly working time by an average of roughly one day a year (the exception being France, with its 35-hour week and lifelong working time). In Denmark, Italy and, to a certain extent, Sweden the reduction of working time assumed various forms for shift workers, with a distinction being drawn between employees working on a two-shift or three-shift basis.

In the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Denmark various steps have been taken to make working time more flexible. In the Netherlands an individual right to part-time work has been introduced. In Belgium, Italy and - with some differences - also in Denmark, a framework for the introduction of half-yearly or annual working time accounts was collectively agreed. Whilst in Italy the hours included on such working time accounts do at least include half the overtime bonus, elsewhere such bonuses are simply ignored, as if to do so was totally natural. In Denmark the period during which no overtime bonuses are accrued has been extended, and the unions have allowed working time experiments to be carried out which deviate from what was collectively agreed.

### 6.3. Additional pension schemes and early retirement

Issues to do with pensions and early retirement are playing an increasingly important role for European collective bargaining policy. In many countries, the unions want to enable older employees to take early retirement so as to create jobs for young people. In one-third of the countries in question, new arrangements have been agreed in this connection. These schemes appear to take two different approaches.

In Belgium, Denmark and the Basque country collective agreements have improved pension schemes or additional pensions schemes. By contrast, the agreements

concluded in France, the Netherlands and Norway offer employees a financial option for stopping work by taking early retirement or working on a part-time basis.

In the Netherlands a fund was set up to support those companies "making serious plans to reduce the working time of older workers". This represents an obvious attempt to influence the labour market, not by means of clear-cut obligations or demands, but by offering financial incentives. The situation in France is quite different: here, together with the works council, company managements can decide which employees aged 55 should work on a part-time basis, and which workers aged 57 should take advantage of the relevant early retirement scheme, with a 15-40% loss in the pay received up to then. In this instance, the companies' interest in innovation matches the unions' labour market interests and in this way - at least, this is what is being stressed - older workers are protected against being overtaxed by technological advances. This solution is being financed partly by the companies concerned, partly out of unemployment funds, and partly by the workers affected (by going without some of their pay).

| <b>EUCOBA Table 7: pensions and early retirement in the European metal industry 1999/2000</b> |  |   |  |  |
|---|--|---|--|--|
|   | <b>pension scale adjustment</b>  | <b>additional pension scheme</b>  | <b>financing early retirement</b>  | <b>financing work time reduction for elder employees</b> |
| bel   |  | 1% of gross wage to aps (instead of a supplementary third wage increase)  |  |  |
| dan   | in 4 annual rates the contribution increased up to 9% for workers and 8,1% for salaried empl.; 2/3 paid by the employer and 1/3 paid by the employee |   |  |  |
| fra   |  |   | Between the ages of 55-57: part time work receiving 65% of gross wage, paid by the company<br>after the age of 57: retirement with 60% of pension, paid by unemployment fund |  |
| hol   |  |   | to boost employment, a fund has been set up to subsidize any companies that make serious plans to reduce the working time of older employees                                 |  |
| nor   |  |   | agreement to secure financing of early retirement arrangement  |  |
| spa-<br>ela   |  | 99 and 00 additional contribution of 0,5% each year to the pension fund; total 00: 3,5%; financed equally by both sides |  |  |

Taking an overall view, it would definitely be in the general interest for this topic to be declared the third main area for examination, to be presented more systematically in future reports.

## 6.4. Vocational training

Vocational training is accorded a similarly important role in collective bargaining.

Roughly one-third of countries mention the improvement of continuing training conditions, but in most cases they only do so in passing and by summing up the situation, e.g. saying that a framework agreement has been concluded on this subject. Belgium and the Netherlands are notable exceptions. In the Netherlands vocational training schemes appear to be amongst the most important results of bargaining. An extensive (in many cases financial) incentives programme has been set up for employees and companies alike, the aim being to make continuing vocational training for employees more attractive to both sides. In Belgium, on the other hand, the unions have managed to secure paid time off to undergo continuing training, with companies undertaking to set aside 0.7% of their employees' working time for continuing training.

Ongoing reporting about new schemes for continuing vocational training would definitely be a useful fourth area to focus on.

| <b>EUCOBA Table 8: training in the European metal industry 1999/2000</b> |  |   |  |
|--|--|---|--|
|  | <b>vocational training time</b>  | <b>improving training conditions</b>  | <b>education fund</b>  |
| bel  | company devotes 0,7% of the achieved working hours to vocational training (7 hours of training for every 1000 working hours) |   |  |
| cze  |  | conditions for training employees, for keeping or improving skills  |  |
| dan  |  |   | * the contributions for different organisations are increased<br>* the white and blue collar funds merge |
| hol  |  | *pay incentives for trainees<br>*registration of interests<br>*subsidies for additional training companies<br>*subsidies for childcare<br>*investmentprogram to improve training institutions |  |
| nor  |  | framework for education/ vocational training  |  |
| swe  |  | one of the aims of the „agreement on training and development“:<br>„extend the versality, competence and skills of the employees  |  |

## **7. Outcome of bargaining with respect to the European Coordination Rule**

Most reports only very vaguely present the economic background to collective bargaining and the results achieved. One-third of the reports say nothing - or virtually nothing - about the economic bases for collective bargaining and another third only say a little, or very little.

Of course, cultural variety and different traditions with regard to submitting and justifying demands in connection with collective agreements play a certain role here. Such differences clearly come to light in the collective bargaining reports. In Austria and Germany wage demands are justified by referring to the favourable growth and productivity situation, with its growing gap between major profit increases and minimal pay increases, and by the claim that an improved demand situation will boost growth. But in most of the other countries which mention the topic, wage demands and pay deals are determined negatively and defensively, namely by the labour market, inflation and competitiveness. In three countries (Denmark, Finland, Switzerland), (national and company-level) competitiveness is a decisive factor. Portugal and Belgium have opted for a middle way in this connection, by gearing their demands to collective agreements concluded in other countries. However, too many countries simply say nothing at all on the subject.

Even fewer countries provide "hard" economic information. The framework report enquired about the rate of inflation and growth in productivity as a parameter for comparing respective wage increases. Only the Austrian and German reports provided the relevant data. And whereas two-thirds of the reports mention the rate of inflation, there is a real dearth of any other macroeconomic information. Increases in productivity, GDP, reference wage costs and labour costs are detailed in two or three reports. However, unemployment levels are mentioned as background information to the bargaining situation in five reports.

EUCOBA should also provide information indicating the extent to which the leeway for distribution sought via the European Coordination Rule and generated by fluctuations in the rate of inflation and boosted productivity has successfully been exploited.

However, if the objective striven for by implementing the European Coordination Rule - namely to prevent mutual underbidding - is to be attained, then in future the economic data with which the member organizations are confronted in their respective countries (increases in the rate of inflation, productivity, social product, labour costs, levels of unemployment, and so forth), have to be systematically compiled.

Under the European Coordination Rule, other elements of collective agreements, besides wage increases, that are effective distribution policy tools (such as an increase in additional pension schemes, fixed amounts included in wage increases, the payment of higher bonuses, and so forth) should also be taken into account. In some countries such elements are included in "increased wage costs" (Denmark) or in the calculation of the "volume of the agreement" (Germany); in others this does not happen, and in many of the reports the question is left unanswered.

The quantification of other elements of the agreement would certainly be desirable, but is certainly not always easy to achieve.

Since these data are of the greatest general interest, it would make sense to try and make them as understandable and comparable as possible. Future reports should more clearly pinpoint the areas of interest. If they are supposed to help breathe life into the European Coordination Rule, then their improvement in these areas is a step in the right direction.

| EUCOBA Table 9:<br>European collective bargaining policy with a view to the European Coordination Rule 1999/2000 |           |      |                    |        |                       |  |                      |      |                           |             |                          |
|--|-----------|------|--------------------|--------|-----------------------|--|----------------------|------|---------------------------|-------------|--------------------------|
|  | org       | year | Pay rise           |        | other                 | explanation: (estimated) yearly rates of |                      |      |                           |             |                          |
|  |           |      | nat/<br>reg        | Loc    |                       | inflation                                | Productivity         | GDP  | reference wage increase   | labour cost | Un-employment            |
| aus  |           | 1    | 1,9%               |        |                       | 0,6%                                     | 1,3%                 | 2,2% |                           |             | 4,4%                     |
| bel  |           | 2    | 4,6%               |        | 1% pension fund       | 1,2%                                     |                      |      | 5,9%                      |             |                          |
| cze  |           | 1    | 0-6%               | ?      |                       |  |                      |      |                           |             |                          |
| dan  |           | 4    | 1/3                | 2/3    | 1%(all but wages)     | 2%                                       |                      |      |                           | 3%          |                          |
| fin  |           | 1    | 3,5-4%             |        |                       | 2%                                       |                      |      |                           | 3,1%        |                          |
| fra  |           | 5    |                    |        | Early retirement      |  |                      |      |                           |             |                          |
| ger  |           | 1    | 4,1%               |        |                       | 1,5%                                     | 2,5%                 |      |                           |             |                          |
| hol  |           | 2    | 7,45%              |        | 1%lumps.              |  |                      |      |                           |             |                          |
| irl  | ICTU      | 3    | 15%-20%            |        | min. 4.40£h           | 4% esti.                                 | 4.4%                 | 8,4% | 5,5%average wage increase |             | 4,7%%                    |
| ita  |           | 2(4) | 3%                 | ?      | lump sum 120.000 LIT  | 1,5%                                     | (only on comp.level) |      |                           |             | 10-12%                   |
| nor  | Felles    | 2    | 14,1%              | ?      |                       | 2,3%                                     |                      |      |                           |             | 3,3%                     |
| nor  | NITO      | 1    |                    | 7%     |                       |  |                      |      |                           |             |                          |
| por  |           | 2    |                    | 5%     |                       |  |                      |      | EC-wages                  |             |                          |
| slk  |           | 3-5  | 8-10,5             |        | injury comp           |  |                      |      |                           |             |                          |
| spa  | CC.O<br>O | 2    | Average 2.35% p.a. |        | Inflation rel. Update | 2,0 esti.<br>2,7 real                    |                      |      |                           |             | 16%<br>20% fixed term c. |
| spa  | ELA       | 1    | 2%-3,35%           |        | Pensions              | 0,6%                                     |                      | 1,4% |                           |             |                          |
| swe  | Metall    | 3    | 4,9%               |        | Wagereview            | 1%                                       |                      |      |                           |             |                          |
| swe  | SIF       | 3    | 4,2%               |        | Wagereview            |  |                      |      |                           |             |                          |
| swi  |           | 1    |                    | 1-1,5% |                       | 1,2%                                     |                      |      |                           |             |                          |

## **8. Political aspects of collective bargaining policy**

Most of the agreements described in the reports were arrived at in bilateral sectoral negotiations. (Only Ireland had a tripartite inter-sectoral agreement.)

Strikes did not play any serious role in the implementation of these agreements. Only a quarter of the countries in question used strike action as an instrument to secure the adoption of the collective agreement currently in force (and most of these only made minimal use of them - Denmark in 1998, Germany warning strikes, the Netherlands a few warning strikes, Italy a 40-hour strike).

Just as frequently mediation or arbitration was required. The countries in which strikes and mediation were required before results could be achieved are virtually the same as those listed above, namely Denmark (1998), Germany and Italy.

However, the encouraging staying power of bilateral talks and the relatively minor role played by mediation or direct state intervention in connection with collective agreements cannot conceal the trend towards basic inter-sectoral agreements. One third of the countries in question already have general, inter-sectoral, tripartite arrangements (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway and Sweden, to be precise).

These arrangements differ primarily in terms of their binding nature vis-à-vis collective bargaining policy. Whereas in Germany the "Bündnis for Arbeit" (Alliance for Jobs) has so far not proved to be anything much more than a non-binding round of talks between the federal government, employers and unions, with IG Metall rejecting the Alliance's limitation on free collective bargaining, in other countries binding agreements have been concluded that restrict the autonomy of sectoral negotiations. In Belgium, for example, this is the level at which agreement is reached on a "reference wage increase" based on the situation in neighbouring countries, and towards which the parties engaged in sectoral negotiations have to gear their efforts. Meanwhile, in Ireland, Italy and Norway the tendency is to agree on binding "rules of play".

In my view, the situation in Sweden appears to be especially interesting, because this is where sectoral collective bargaining was first based on a basic agreement that came about without the government's involvement, but rather as the result of the efforts of 7 Swedish trade unions and 12 employers' federations. In this basic agreement the parties pledge to use a new kind of system governing bargaining procedures, which equips an "impartial chairperson" with extremely extensive powers, enabling the person in question to intervene in negotiations, support one side and take steps to prevent strikes.

Meanwhile, the situation in Portugal is quite different. Here, the union Fequimetal is more bent on avoiding officially possible government interference in negotiations and collective agreements and concluding collective agreements with the employers on as autonomous a basis as possible.

**EUCOBA Table 10: Political and economic background 1999/2000**

|     |                         | <b>Tools</b>  | <b>political implications</b>  | <b>Economical situation</b>  |
|-----|-------------------------|---|--|--|
| aus | National Sectoral       | *one month of classic bipartite negotiations<br><br>*agreement covers entire workforce, not just union members  | *demand was based on the upswing of domestic demand, which was due to increased income in real terms   | GDP: 2.2%<br>Productivity: 1.3%<br>Inflation: 0.6%<br>Unemployment: 4.4%   |
| bel | National Sectoral       | *three months of bipartite negotiations<br><br>*agreement binding by law to all companies in the sector   | *the inter-sectoral agreement concluded in December 1998 sets some standards and provides some pointers  | a reference wage increase of 5.9% was agreed at inter-sectoral level, after comparison with the situation in neighbouring countries  |
| cze | National Sub-sectoral   | *four months of bipartite negotiations<br>*arbitration  |  |  |
| dan | National Sectoral       | *bipartite negotiations and mediation<br>*2000: ballot with 80% approval rate<br><br>*the agreement serves as a reference for the entire private sector | *traditional extensive union demands<br>*employers: working time flexibility<br>*due to the troubled situation in 1998, in 2000 a result was reached comparatively early on<br>(*1998: strike and government intervention) | various research institutes indicated that a 3% increase in labour costs would be acceptable for the competitiveness of Danish industry<br><br>1998: 4% labour cost increase |
| fin | National sectoral       | *bipartite negotiations<br>*new: more intensive coordination between blue- and white-collar unions  | *government tax solution led to a 1% wage increase   | *geared towards employment, international competitiveness and a positive development of real incomes   |
| fra | National sectoral       | bipartite negotiations  | *pilot agreement in the car industry<br>*aim of creating new jobs for young people   |  |
| ger | Regional sectoral       | *bipartite negotiations<br>*mediation<br>*warning strikes<br>*fixing date for strike ballot   | *IG Metall justified its actions by invoking the need to increase purchasing power and "fair distribution"<br>*employers demanded more wage flexibility  | * forecast productivity: 3.5%<br>* forecast inflation 1.5%<br>*growing gap between soaring profits and low wage increases  |
| hol | National Sectoral       | *bipartite negotiations<br>*some lightning strikes  |  | wage policy refers to labour productivity and production costs   |
| irl | National Inter-sectoral | the parties involved are: the government, employers, unions, farmers, and the community and voluntary sector<br><br>(tripartite)                        | *the new agreement is called "Programme for Prosperity and Fairness"<br>*most contentious point: introduction of a national minimum wage at £4.40/h  | *GDP growth 8.4%<br>*unemployment 5%<br>*average weekly earnings: £305.47<br>*average hours worked per week: 40.7<br>*estimated hourly earnings increase: 5.5%               |

**EUCOBA Table 10: Political and economic background 1999/2000**

|     |   | <b>Tools</b>   | <b>political implications</b>  | <b>Economical situation</b>   |
|-----|---|--|--|---|
| ita | National sectoral                       | 9 months of bargaining with:<br>*bipartite negotiations<br>*mediation by the Ministry of Labour<br>*40-hour strike   | *basic national inter-sectoral tripartite framework agreement fixing the unions' demands<br>*initially employers fiercely opposed a national collective bargaining agreement<br>*then employers demanded total working time flexibility<br>*and inclusion of all costs of the agreement in 3%<br>*most contentious point: the right to national coll.barg. | *annual rate of inflation: 1.5%<br>*unemployment: 10-12%  |
| nor | National sectoral                       | *bipartite negotiations  | *tripartite employment pact formed the basis of negotiations   | *cooperation between the government and the "labour market parties" to boost employment and achieve steady, low price and pay increases with a certain improvement in real earnings |
| Por | National sub-sectoral                   | *bipartite negotiations (but difficult situation)<br>*organizing action on a company-by-company basis  | *federation avoiding government intervention (possible by law)<br>*aimed at defending acquired welfare, union rights, gradually reducing working time to 35 h<br>*employers: total deregulation  | *demands are based on an analysis of the economic situation: inflation, gains in productivity and bringing salaries more in line with EU levels                                     |
| Slk | National-sectoral                       | three rounds of bipartite negotiations   |  |   |
| Spa | Regional sectoral<br>local sub-sectoral | (negotiations at regional or company level)  | *employment is a prime concern in cb;<br>*agreements have 3 possible employment clauses:<br>1) limiting the number of temporary contracts<br>2) restricting the use of temporary agencies<br>3) clauses for converting fixed-term into unlimited contracts   | *unemployment rate still over 16%, but falling<br>* over 30% of contracts for the economy as a whole are temporary (nearly 20% in the metalworking sector)                          |
| Swe | National sectoral                       | *bipartite negotiations, but for the first time based on a new basic agreement, signed by seven Swedish trade unions and 12 employers' organizations within the industrial sector;<br>*the basic agreement established a new system governing bargaining procedures, including the timetable, the appointment of an impartial chairperson, who can support either party and intervene in the negotiations as well as take measures to avoid disputes/industrial action |  |   |
| Swi | local sectoral                          | *bargaining is done by the works councils and management at company level  | *the SMUV Industry Congress (assembly of union representatives) issues instructions regarding wage demands   | *generally, the demand calls for full compensation for price increases plus a 1-2% increase in real wages<br>*the negotiations take account of the competitiveness of the           |

| EUCOBA Table 10: Political and economic background 1999/2000 |  |       |                        |                      |
|--|--|-------|------------------------|----------------------|
|  |  | Tools | political implications | Economical situation |
|  |  |       |                        | company in question  |

The reports mention in passing, but clearly, that extremely virulent fundamental battles against "total deregulation" (Portugal), for fundamental union rights, the recognition of the party to collective bargaining and against collective-bargaining-free areas are taking place especially in southern Europe and in marginal areas. In Italy and Spain there are question marks about national sectoral agreements and in Portugal, Ireland and the Czech Republic, too, the unions often find themselves in a very precarious situation.

## Eucoba Table 11: presentation scheme 1999/2000 (Nov. 1999)

1. **Headline:** \* country  
\* date  
\* issues
  
2. **Results:** (example)  
\* agreement about wages and salaries  
\* components of wage increase  
(percentage, lump sum; other)  
\* volumes: 1) total; 2) 1999; 3) long-term
  
3. **Classification:** \* collective bargaining parties involved  
\* bargaining level  
\* scope/area (region, sector, company)  
\* size of workforce covered by the agreement  
\* term/duration (valid from ... to; number of months)
  
4. **Importance:** \* framework agreement?  
\* regional agreement?  
\* pilot agreement?  
\* single case?  
\* quality of obligation/advice?
  
5. **Role of tools:** \* bipartite (classic) negotiations?  
\* mediation?  
\* summit meetings?  
\* tripartite meetings?  
\* government?  
\* arbitration?  
\* strike?
  
6. **Demands and negotiation procedure:**  
  
\* union demands  
(with brief analysis of the economic situation)  
\* rates of productivity gains and inflation  
\* increase in GDP  
\* unemployment level  
\* employers' demands (offers)  
\* main contentious points  
\* course of negotiations  
\* concessions

| <b>EucoBa Table 12: responsible correspondents of the eucoBa network</b> |                     |                       |                                      |
|--|---------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <b>Country</b>   | <b>organisation</b> | <b>name</b>           | <b>e-mail</b>                        |
| aus  | GMBE                | Anderle, Manfred      | Manfred_Anderle@gmbe.oegb.or.at      |
| bel  | CMB                 | Biebaut, Frans        | fbiebaut@abvmetaal.org               |
| bel  | CCMB                | Diesbecq, Nathalie    | ccmb@acv.csc.be                      |
| cze  | OS KOVO             | Soucek, Jaroslav      | Studnicna.Lucie@cmkos.cz             |
| dan  | CO-Industri         | Bundvad, Jens         | jb@co-industri.dk                    |
| dan  | IDA                 | Ostergaard, Christel  | COE@IDA.DK                           |
| fin  | Metalli             | Löhman, Jorma         | jorma.lohman@metallilitto.fi         |
| fin  | STL                 | Ojanen, Petteri       | Petteri.Ojanen@STL.fi                |
| fra  | FGMM CFDT           | Landas, Blandine      | blandine.landas@fgmm.cfdt.fr         |
| ger  | IG Metall           | Schauer, Helmut       | helmut.schauer@igmetall.de           |
| hol  | FNV                 | Berghuis, Jan         | linepaul@bg.fnv.nl                   |
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